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Deconstructing and Reconstructing Hobbes 
Isaak I. Dore* 
ABSTRACT 
The political and legal philosophy of Thomas Hobbes is often 
misunderstood or oversimplified. The two most well-known aspects 
of his philosophy (the condition of man in the pre-political state of 
nature and his concept of sovereign power) are not properly 
connected to show the unity of his thought. However, systematic 
study shows that Hobbes’s political and legal philosophy has a 
sophisticated underlying unity and coherence. At the heart of this 
unity is Hobbes’s utilitarian consequentialist ethic, which 
remarkably anticipates the major strands of contemporary 
consequentialism. To explain the unity in Hobbes’s philosophy via 
his consequentialist thought, the Article deconstructs and 
reconstructs the principal elements of Hobbes’s concept of 
sovereign obligation, his deism and theory of the divine covenant, 
his conceptions of the state of nature, the duties of the sovereign in 
civil society, and the rights and duties following from subject to 
sovereign and sovereign to subject. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes is often 
misunderstood or oversimplified. The two most well-known 
aspects of his philosophy (the condition of man in his pre-political 
state of nature and the nature of sovereign power) are not properly 
connected to show the unity of his thought. Instead, focus on 
man’s life in the former as poor, nasty, brutish and short presents 
an overly crude psychology of man;1 whereas focus in the latter on 
the omnipotence of sovereign power creates the misleading 
impression of the hapless citizen-subject caught in the grip of brute 
power against which there is no recourse and no escape.2 
However, systematic study shows that Hobbes’s political 
philosophy has a sophisticated underlying unity and coherence. At 
the heart of this unity is Hobbes’s utilitarian consequentialist ethic. 
                                                                                                             
 1. For such a view of Hobbes’s state of nature, see LINDA S. BISHAI, 
FORGETTING OURSELVES: SECESSION AND THE (IM)POSSIBILITY OF TERRITORIAL 
IDENTITY 73 (2004). 
 2. For such a discussion of the notion of sovereign power, see James H. 
Read, Thomas Hobbes: Power in the State of Nature, Power in Civil Society, 23 
POLITY 505 (1991). 
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Hobbes’s views on the following will be utilized to demonstrate 
how consequentialism imbues and unifies his philosophy: the nature 
of political society; the scope of sovereign obligation; the theory of 
the divine covenant; the duties of the sovereign; the state of nature; 
and rights and obligations of people and the sovereign in civil 
society.  
I. HOBBES AND CONSEQUENTIALISM 
It is the consequentialist impulses of Hobbes’s political 
philosophy that give it its underlying unity and coherence, and 
which have been neglected all too often. In order to explain this it 
will be necessary to reconstruct the principal elements of Hobbes’s 
political philosophy in the ensuing sections. 
Hobbes’s thought anticipates several strands of contemporary 
consequentialism. Although this is not the focus of this Article, it is 
helpful to describe these strands in order to understand how they 
bring unity and coherence to Hobbes’s doctrine as a whole. 
The cardinal postulate of consequentialism is that values exist 
independently of morality. Although morality is largely focused on 
evaluations of agents and of character, consequentialist evaluations 
focus on situations and outcomes. Thus, if an action produces a 
desirable result in a given situation, then the act is “good.”3 An 
important feature of consequentialism is the idea that the value of a 
particular course of action is determined from an agent-neutral 
perspective.4 An agent-neutral perspective is derived from the 
viewpoint of society as a whole, whereas an agent-relative 
perspective is derived from the viewpoint of a particular individual.5 
Since values are assessed purely in accordance with the 
consequences of actions, they are essentially instrumental and non-
moral in character.6 
There are several distinct branches or “schools” of 
consequentialism, such as welfare consequentialism,7 rule 
consequentialism,8 act consequentialism,9 and utilitarianism.10 
However, all consequentialist approaches are based on theories of 
the intrinsic and incommensurable value of outcomes generated 
                                                                                                             
 3. TIM MULGAN, THE DEMANDS OF CONSEQUENTIALISM 3 (2001). 
 4. Stephen L. Darwall, Introduction, in CONSEQUENTIALISM 2 (Stephen L. 
Darwall ed., 2003). 
 5. See id. at 1. 
 6. Id. at 2. 
 7. See infra Part I.A. 
 8. See infra Part I.B. 
 9. See infra Part I.C. 
 10. See infra Part I.A. 
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from an agent-neutral perspective. Of course, Hobbes did not 
consciously adopt any one of these approaches, much less was he a 
self-proclaimed consequentialist. Yet paradoxically, he was, in 
contemporary terms, a welfare consequentialist, a rule 
consequentialist, an act consequentialist and a utilitarian all at 
once. Before discussing how these strands of consequentialism are 
implicit in Hobbes’s political doctrine, it is necessary to first set 
forth their basic postulates. Welfare consequentialism and 
utilitarianism overlap so much that they are treated together for 
purposes of this article, without denying that they could or should 
be treated separately in other contexts. 
A. Welfare Consequentialism/Utilitarianism 
This strand of consequentialist thought espouses one or the 
other of two non-moral value theories. The first is a hedonistic 
value theory under which pleasure is the only incommensurable 
value. The second is the desire-based conception of welfare that is 
evident in Hobbes’s political doctrine. Both of these value theories 
stress that the valued consequence must have meaning initially in 
an agent-relative sense, but which is then abstracted at the 
aggregate societal level. The starting point is always a valuable 
outcome for some conscious being, usually, but not always, 
involving a subjective consciousness. A hedonistic pursuit is 
viewed as intrinsically valuable due to its pleasurable impact on 
the experience of the conscious being; similarly, desire-based 
pursuits of welfare are intrinsically gratifying due to their positive 
impact on mental states.  
As demonstrated below, Hobbes’s advocacy of a political 
society with a unitary sovereign reveals a desire-based conception 
of welfare. Indeed, for Hobbes, the move to such a society is an 
objective need (if not necessity), for it is only in such a society that 
man’s desire for security and self-aggrandizement can be 
optimized. Hobbes the consequentialist is iterating that the sum 
total of benefits to all subjects under civil society outweighs the 
costs (such as the duty of unconditional obedience or the duty to 
lay down one’s arms). 
According to John Stuart Mill, perhaps the most classical 
exponent of utilitarian thought, utilitarianism is “[t]he creed which 
accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest 
Happiness Principle, [and] holds that actions are right in proportion 
as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce 
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the reverse of happiness.”11 In Mill’s words, therefore, the core 
feature of utilitarianism is the normative judgment of an action in 
accordance with its consequences (i.e. whether the action promotes 
happiness or unhappiness).12 Indeed, this form of welfare 
utilitarianism judges the normative value of an action by 
comparing the benefits and costs of a particular course of action to 
all affected parties.13 The value of an action thus depends on 
whether the utility (i.e., benefits in the form of welfare, happiness 
or pleasure) of the action outweighs the costs (i.e., pain or 
misfortune).14 Because pain and pleasure are, respectively, 
universally good and bad, utilitarianism invokes an agent-neutral 
perspective to argue that it is bad whenever pain happens, yet good 
whenever pleasure (or desire) is satisfied.15 In a famous passage 
from An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 
Jeremy Bentham elaborated upon the utilitarian perspective:  
An action then may be said to be conformable to the 
principle of utility, or, for shortness sake, to utility, 
(meaning with respect to the community at large) when the 
tendency it has to augment the happiness of the community 
is greater than any which it has to diminish it.16  
Thus, to a utilitarian such as Bentham or Mill, an action should be 
undertaken when the consequences of that action result in the 
greatest net utility, or benefits, to the community.17 
Contemporary classical utilitarianism abstracts this principle 
agent-neutrally at the societal level. A concise formulation is given 
by Rawls: “The main idea is that society is rightly ordered, and 
therefore just, when its major institutions are arranged so as to 
achieve the greatest net balance of satisfaction summed over all the 
individuals belonging to it.”18 
                                                                                                             
 11. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 55 (Roger Crisp ed., Oxford Univ. 
Press 1998). 
 12. See id. 
 13. Darwall, supra note 4, at 3. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Stephen L. Darwall, Introduction, in DEONTOLOGY 1 (Stephen L. 
Darwall ed., 2003). 
 16. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 
AND LEGISLATION 3 (London, Oxford Univ. Press, 2d. ed. 1876) (1823). 
 17. Now, Hobbes was writing as a political consequentialist, not as an 
economist, much less as a moral theorist. He was convinced that, at the political 
level at least, society as a whole would enjoy the greatest net benefit only under 
his vision of civil society, under his structure of civil authority, and under his 
conception of sovereign duty. See infra text accompanying notes 55–65, 73–74, 
84, 87–88, 146–48, 155–69, 204, 219–39, 250–53, 263–90. 
 18. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 22 (1971). 
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Just as all consequentialist theories are grounded on non-moral 
agent-neutral values, Hobbes’s philosophy as a whole is outcome 
oriented and posits its political framework as having an intrinsic 
agent-neutral (and therefore non-relative) value. This value is 
appreciated or measured agent-neutrally in terms of overall societal 
peace rather than moral assessment of the person of the Hobbesian 
sovereign or his character. The moral character of the sovereign 
may of course be a part of the assessment, but that is, stricto sensu, 
not relevant to and distinct from a systemic evaluation of the 
Hobbesian political order and its commensurability with pax et 
justitia, overall good government, and public welfare. The 
Hobbesian vision of the optimum political conditions of civil 
society, the desired structure of civil government, the instrumental 
nature of sovereign rights and obligations, as well as the 
instrumental nature of his theory of punishment, are all desire-
dependent. Their adoption is pivoted on the non-moral and agent-
neutral projection of possible outcomes for society as a whole. 
B. Rule Consequentialism 
For the rule consequentialist the normative value of action does 
not depend upon a simple analysis of the consequences of the 
action. Instead, the consequences of a particular rule requiring, 
permitting, or prohibiting an act or conduct must be examined. 
When social acceptance of a particular rule leads to the best 
consequences as compared with other rules for similar 
circumstances, then that rule should prevail. Hooker defines rule 
consequentialism as a form of consequentialism in which 
preference is given to “the [moral] code whose collective 
internalization has the best consequences.”19 
In what way, then, can Hobbes be seen to be a rule 
consequentialist? His doctrine envisages collective as well as 
individual internalization of rules in foro interno.20 The collective 
internalization embodies three fundamental rules; the first 
requiring the transition to civil society, the second requiring 
obedience to the sovereign, and the third establishing the pre-
political character of obligation. All three rules are agent-neutral.21 
But, the sovereign is also bound by natural law, which Hobbes 
believes is a superior moral law that commands the sovereign to 
make rules promoting the good of the community, to practice just 
                                                                                                             
 19. BRAD HOOKER, IDEAL CODE, REAL WORLD: A RULE CONSEQUENTIALIST 
THEORY OF MORALITY 2 (2000); see also Darwall, supra note 4, at 2. 
 20. See infra text accompanying notes 184–89.  
 21. See infra text accompanying notes 249–70. 
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judgment, humanity, mercy and benevolence, and to protect 
property and liberty, all of which are clearly secular and utilitarian 
goods. As demonstrated below, the sovereign is accountable to god 
for breaching these rules, but this accountability is seen by Hobbes 
not as a good in itself; rather, it is a good because it serves the 
utilitarian goal of good governance.22 
Another example of how Hobbes may be seen as a rule 
consequentialist is his rule that “every man ought to endeavour 
peace, as far as he has a hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot 
obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of 
war.”23 According to Hobbes, this agent-neutral rule, particularly 
the obligation “to endeavour peace,” says Hobbes, “binds the 
conscience” in foro interno; in other words, its origin is agent-
relative in that it has value for every conscious being. Yet, Hobbes 
deftly moves to aggregate the rule at the society-wide level through 
the principle of reciprocity.24 This rule then becomes a “dictate of 
right reason” or a “general rule of reason” knowable to all men.25 
C. Act Consequentialism 
Like other variants of consequentialism, act consequentialism 
embraces the idea of the preferential ranking of overall conditions 
of society agent-neutrally. These overall rankings are not supposed 
to differ from person to person but are to be judged as the best for 
society as a whole. Upon providing some yardstick for generating 
these rankings, act consequentialism requires each agent to act in 
such a way as to attain the best ranked overall good.26 Put 
differently, the value of the consequences of any given course of 
action is to be compared with that of any other under the 
circumstances, and preference is to be given to that course of 
action which yields the best overall results.27 
The yardstick provided by Hobbes is, of course, in the political 
arena. The act consequentialism in Hobbes’s political doctrine is 
evident in the “acts” of moving to civil society, and of structuring 
civil government. Most of his ideas in this branch of 
consequentialism overlap with the other two branches. As already 
                                                                                                             
 22. See infra text accompanying notes 83–88, 135–40, 146–69. 
 23. See infra text accompanying notes 191–96. 
 24. See infra text accompanying notes 197–204.  
 25. See infra text accompanying notes 55–62, 188–97, 254–57. 
 26. SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM 1 (1994). 
 27. MULGAN, supra note 3, at 3. 
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pointed out, Hobbes did not consciously adopt consequentialism; 
rather his doctrine as a whole shows many affinities with it.28  
As this Article explains more fully below, Hobbes is very 
much an ethical subjectivist insofar as he defines value in terms of 
subjective preference. Given Hobbes’s “psychological egoism” 
the doctrine that man is driven by selfish desire“good” is 
defined in terms of individual self-interest and “bad” in terms of 
what the individual is averse to.29 Thus, civil society is an 
individual “good” that all rational individuals find beneficial. This, 
in turn, means that civil society embodies “individual 
rationalism.”30 However, since the individual lives in community 
with all other subjects of society, each of whom believes himself to 
be better off living within a political order than without it, the civil 
and political order embodies collective rationality.31 
What is the genesis of this collective rationality? How is it 
established? Why is it established? What is the nature of this 
rationality as reflected by the sovereign order? These (and related) 
issues are discussed in the ensuing sections. The next two sections, 
respectively, explain the genesis and mode of manifestation of 
collective rationality through Hobbes’s theory of a “covenant” 
between each individual subject and the sovereign. This 
“contractarian” view of civil society is essentially consequentialist 
in outlook. 
 
                                                                                                             
 28. Consequentialist approaches may be contrasted with approaches that are 
deontological. In contrast to consequentialism, deontologists do not believe that 
the normative value of an action can be judged on the basis of whether it 
promotes the best outcome from an agent-neutral perspective. Darwall, supra 
note 4, at 2. In other words, if an individual judges an action as “right,” that 
judgment is not derived from the consequences of the action, but occurs prior to 
any assessment of the action’s potentially good consequences. Darwall, supra 
note 15, at 3–4. Thus, unlike consequentialists, deontologists believe that 
judgments are made from a moral, agent-relative position. Id. at 1–2. 
Deontologists justify this conclusion by arguing that normative judgments 
depend upon many considerations in addition to consequence, such as one’s 
relations with others in society, one’s sense of the sanctity of an obligation, and 
how an action will impact others. Id. at 4–6. Like consequentialism, deontology 
contains several branches, including contractualism (relations with others) and 
intuitionism (sanctity of obligations). See id. at 3. 
 29. JEAN HAMPTON, HOBBES AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT TRADITION 22–
24 (1986). Hampton adds the characteristic of “shortsightedness” to that of 
egoism. Id. at 80–89. See generally Mark C. Murphy, Hobbes’ Shortsightedness 
Account of Conflict, 31 S. J. PHIL. 239–53 (1993). 
 30. HAMPTON, supra note 29, at 239–47. 
 31. Id. 
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II. THE GENESIS OF RATIONALITY: HOBBES AND 
CONTRACTARIANISM 
Consequentialist social theory has many affinities with 
contractarian theory. The latter is essentially based on a pre-
supposed social contract between the citizen and government. As a 
political theory, contractarianism is a rejection of anarchism in 
favor of establishing the conditions for the legitimate exercise of 
political coercion.32 There are several overlapping versions of this 
approach such as “political,” “moral,” “analytic” and “normative” 
contractarianism.33 Kraus presents a three-stage schema for the 
contractarian argument, which all versions of contractarianism 
share. A specific hypothetical scenario of interacting individuals in 
an original pre-political condition is posited as the starting point. 
The individuals can be given particular characteristics ranging 
from the general to the specific, for example, rationality, egoism, 
shortsightedness, risk aversion, intellect, etc.34 For the purposes of 
this Article, the first characteristic of rationality is important 
because, as this Article demonstrates, Hobbes attributes a measure 
of rationality to all individuals.35 
Rationality can be defined narrowly as utility maximization, so 
that the (rational) individual is viewed as a maximizer of his utility 
function.36 Depending on the characteristics that the individuals 
have under the first hypothetical scenario, they will then seek out 
(i.e., “contract” for) a set of social arrangements to pursue a 
particular political or moral agenda. This is the second phase of the 
schema that Kraus has in mind. 
The third and final phase of the contractarian argument is the 
overall justification of the contractual arrangement. In the 
Hobbesian context, rational individuals can appreciate that life in 
their hypothetical, pre-political condition is, or would be, nasty, 
brutish and short on account of their individual egoism, 
shortsightedness and general unwillingness to cooperate. As 
rational individuals, they would prefer to live cooperatively, but no 
one would find it rational to comply with the terms of 
cooperation.37 They therefore conclude that the best (if not the 
                                                                                                             
 32. JODY S. KRAUS, THE LIMITS OF HOBBESIAN CONTRACTARIANISM 254 
(1993). 
 33. Id. at 2–3. 
 34. Id. at 4; HAMPTON, supra note 29, at 82. 
 35. GREGORY S. KAVKA, HOBBESIANS POLITICAL AND MORAL THEORY 85 
(1986) (“The idealized individuals of Hobbes’ theory are . . . assumed to be 
rational.”). 
 36. KRAUS, supra note 32, at 5, 258. 
 37. Id. at 197. 
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only) way of preventing war of every man against every man is to 
transfer their right to individual self preservation to the sovereign 
by way of a perpetual “covenant.” This is the only rational strategy 
of survival.38 The political sovereign is the individually as well as 
the collectively rational solution, and is therefore morally 
legitimate, which is essentially the conclusion that the third phase 
of the contractarian argument is designed to validate. 
In other words, the moral legitimacy of the sovereign is 
inferred from the second schema argument that rational individuals 
will submit to a political sovereign, given their perilous pre-
political natural condition. The third and final prong of the 
contractarian argument thus reduces morality to mere rationality 
which, in turn, is harnessed to establish the moral legitimacy of the 
political sovereign.39 A number of theoretical devices can be used 
to buttress the legitimacy of the Hobbesian political sovereign, 
among them rational choice theory and game theory. Each is 
outlined below. 
A. Legitimation Through Rational Choice Theory 
A similar argument of legitimacy is made in the context of 
rational choice theory: Individuals in the state of nature can 
rationally conclude to pursue a joint cooperative strategy with 
which most ideally rational individuals would not only agree but 
would also comply. Thus, in rational choice theory, there is a 
fundamental connection between agreement and compliance.40 In 
other words, there would be no point to agreeing if there is no 
guarantee of compliance. This guarantee is provided by the 
sovereign. Still proceeding with rationality as utility maximization, 
the rational individual thus expects to maximize his net expected 
utility. However, in a political union the individuals must accept 
some constraints on their utility maximizing behavior on the theory 
that they will actually be better off with constraints than without 
them. These constraints are essentially moral in nature. This then is 
another way of deriving morality from rationality.41 
                                                                                                             
 38. KAVKA, supra note 35, at 210 (asserting that the terms of the new 
political association would specify certain economic measures, government 
powers, and individual liberties). 
 39. See HAMPTON, supra note 29, at 32. For a searching critique of the 
reductive argument as well as the argument of validation, see KRAUS, supra note 
32, at 73–103. According to Kraus, the latter argument “rests on dubious 
empirical claims concerning the intrinsic nature of humankind . . . .” Id. at 102; 
see also DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT 84 (1986).  
 40. GAUTHIER, supra note 39, at 178. 
 41. Id. at 84. 
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However, this morality is neither individual nor natural; rather, 
it is mutual and conventional. This conventional morality 
constrains natural behavior. It maximizes individual advantage by 
applying the weakest constraints on natural behavior. The latter 
type of behavior, as seen below, is dictated by the principle of 
might, not right. However conventional reason will triumph over 
natural reason in the end. 
For Hobbes, deliberation is the use of reason to obtain desired 
ends. That which is against desire is also against reason. The 
measure of the reasonableness of an action is therefore the extent 
to which it conduces to the agent’s desires. This is a universal 
principle of human motivation applying both in the pre-political as 
well as in the post-political order. In the pre-political state of 
nature, the individual could only look to his own reason to 
determine what was “right reason.” The gauge of what is “right” is 
what conforms with one’s own reason. Thus the right of nature is a 
rational not a moral conception.  
Yet the natural condition is one of permanent war; and this is 
not conducive to life. Indeed, it jeopardizes life as the primary 
good. So just as the state of war is not advantageous to man, so the 
right of nature (which is a license to war) is also not advantageous. 
As long as the natural right endures there can be no security. 
Therefore, it is in the individual’s self-interest to lay down the right 
to nature. This is not an ordinance of morality; rather, it is a dictate 
of reason, affording the greatest net individual utility. When the 
right to nature is laid down, individual behavior is necessarily 
constrained. It marks the emergence of obligation. It is in this way 
that the laws of nature provide for the rational introduction of a 
morality that is neither individual nor natural, but rather mutual 
and conventional. This conventional (or “contractarian”) morality 
consists of a set of conventions distinguishing right from wrong, 
not in terms of what is inherently good or bad, but in terms of what 
maximizes the greatest net utility for all, the conditio sine qua non 
being that every other subject adheres to the new conventional 
morality.  
This type of “moral contractarianism” evidences a rational 
motivation to comply with the rules of morality. A substantive 
theory of morality would thus explain how ideally rational persons 
come to agreement on the distribution of the cooperative surplus 
generated by their cooperative strategy.42  
 
                                                                                                             
 42. KRAUS, supra note 32, at 263. For a critique, see id. at 270; GAUTHIER, 
supra note 39, at 84, 154, 200–32. 
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B. Legitimation Through Game Theory 
In addition to rational choice theory, the choices facing man in 
the hypothetical Hobbesian state of nature can also be analyzed 
under game theory. As the foregoing has demonstrated, rational 
choice theory focuses on individual action directed at maximizing 
utility functions, with the individual making certain rational 
decisions to maximize his utility largely without taking into 
account choices made by others. Traditional game theoretic 
analyses make the latter an integral part of the puzzle. The 
distinction between rational choice theory and game theory can be 
summed up as the difference between a rational actor treating his 
environment as a givenonly estimating how his actions will 
affect itand a rational agent making choices depending on what 
other rational agents will do.43 
All games incorporate three fundamental elements. First, there 
exist two or more rational agents, each with a choice of strategies. 
Second, each agent’s strategy has an outcome. Lastly, each 
strategy leads to a pay-off, measured by the value of a particular 
outcome.44 Game theory can also incorporate more nuanced 
concepts like coercive societal norms, which Hobbes proposes as a 
solution to the problem which Hollis calls the “Leviathan Trap.”45 
The greater the incorporation of nuanced concepts the more 
complex the game, such that game theory can become quite 
complicated. 
The result of a “game” that simulates a grouping of two or 
more subjects in a Hobbesian political society can justify concepts 
such as absolute authority of the sovereign and its status as the sole 
legitimate source of coercion. Imagine an agreement in which each 
man says to every other man that he will give up his right to self-
governance on the condition that the other does the same.  
Each man thus has a choice between cooperating and not 
cooperating under the proposed arrangement. Each will rationally 
                                                                                                             
 43. See J. ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND 
IRRATIONALITY (1979). A model often used is the standard single-play 
prisoner’s dilemma in which at least two rational actors have to make a choice 
that would maximize individual utility such that everyone is better off without 
anyone being worse off. In the original example two prisoners are interrogated 
separately and each is offered a reduction of sentence (three months) if he 
confesses but the other does not. The latter would have a ten year sentence. If he 
does not confess but the other does he will get ten years in prison while the other 
gets a three month sentence. If neither confesses both get a one year sentence. If 
both confess, both will get an eight year sentence. In this scenario confession 
would be the best strategy.  
 44. MARTIN HOLLIS, THE CUNNING OF REASON 30 (1987). 
 45. Id. at 36. 
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rank his overall preferences under the following game theoretic 
model: (1) non-cooperation while other subjects cooperate, (2) 
everyone cooperates, (3) nobody cooperates, and (4) cooperation 
while other subjects do not cooperate. Cooperation becomes a 
man’s dominant strategyin the above game it will be chosen by 
every man because it avoids the worst result and makes the best 
result possible. That cooperation would always be chosen shows 
that rational agents make strategic choices based on the expected 
actions of other men. There is thus a rational appreciation that each 
agent benefits more under a cooperative strategy than he loses by 
refraining from a non-cooperative/competitive strategy. Further, it 
justifies Hobbes’s solution that subjects be kept in constant awe of 
sovereign power in order to enforce the cooperation strategy.46  
C. Conclusion 
The above contractarian views of Hobbesian political 
sovereignty have been deliberately oversimplified. They can be 
(and have been) re-described with much greater richness and 
sophistication.47 The essential point of the foregoing recitation is to 
draw out the parallels between consequentialism and the various 
approaches to contractarianism. All these approaches are 
instrumental; all are motivated by considerations of utility; all are 
applicable in the Hobbesian context; all suggest that Hobbes 
viewed man as only minimally rational and that this minimal 
rationality is what drives him to the covenant with his fellow men. 
The particular characteristics of minimal rationality in the 
Hobbesian context is demonstrated by the fact that Hobbes posits 
no intuitive pre-political assumptions of morality as a basis for 
human interaction. Indeed, human interaction in the Hobbesian 
pre-political state of nature is entirely unfettered by moral 
constraints, and Hobbes makes no normative assumptions beyond 
minimum rationality for the political bargain struck between the 
subjects on one hand, and between the subjects and the sovereign 
on the other.48 
Whether viewed through a consequentialist or contractarian 
lens, it becomes apparent that Hobbes’s conception of the state of 
                                                                                                             
 46. Id. at 36–39; see also David Gauthier, Why Ought One Obey God? 
Reflections on Hobbes and Locke, 7 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 425, 436 (1977). 
 47. See generally KRAUS, supra note 32; HAMPTON, supra note 29; DAVID 
P. GAUTHIER, THE LOGIC OF LEVIATHAN: THE MORAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 
OF THOMAS HOBBES (1969); KAVKA, supra note 35; see also GAUTHIER, supra 
note 39; HOLLIS, supra note 44. 
 48. KRAUS, supra note 32, at 35–36. 
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nature is more hypothetical than historical.49 The hypothesis is 
essentially that even the minimally rational man will understand 
that he will be “better off” living in civil society than living 
without it. Thus civil society is individually rational in an agent-
relative sense; that is, each individual can maximize his individual 
utility. Hobbes then builds a collectively rational case for civil 
society by arguing that everyone is better off, i.e., that civil society 
is mutually advantageous once the all powerful sovereign is in 
place.50 Another way of expressing the collective rationality (and 
therefore utility) of civil society is through the hypothesis that 
individuals actually living in civil society with a political 
organization would be “worse off” if they dismantled it and 
returned to the state of nature.51 
Yet one might ask why is society better off under civil 
government? The answer is to be found in Hobbes’s psychology of 
man as a self-interested egoist who has a natural urge to pursue 
pleasure and avoid pain.52 Rationality at the individual level is 
directly traceable to individual egoism.53 However, it has been 
argued that the Hobbesian conception of individual rationality goes 
beyond simple maximization of utility functions, in that humans 
are “healthy deliberators” who prefer to make choices in light of 
all relevant facts, free from distorting influences and unaffected by 
deteriorating mental or other physiological processes.54 If that is 
the case, individuals will have an even more acute if not 
sophisticated understanding of the beneficial consequences of civil 
society. 
III. THE MODE OF MANIFESTATION OF COLLECTIVE RATIONALITY 
According to Hobbes the creation of a political society with a 
unitary sovereign authority is an objective necessity, for as 
discussed below, it is only in political society that man’s search for 
security and self-aggrandizement is best pursued. Hobbes believed 
that a permanent framework for peace and security is only created 
if men unite under a political sovereign.55 While this union is an 
                                                                                                             
 49. See infra text accompanying notes 169–73, 184–89, 218. 
 50. See HAMPTON, supra note 29, at 239–47. 
 51. See KRAUS, supra note 32, at 68 for a critique of this hypothesis. 
 52. Id. at 22–23. But see KAVKA, supra note 35, at 29 (arguing that 
“psychological egoism,” the doctrine that the Hobbesian man is selfish, is 
erroneous). 
 53. KRAUS, supra note 32, at 57.  
 54. HAMPTON, supra note 29, at 40. 
 55. Under this union men agree  
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expression of collective rationality, it is also in accordance with the 
laws of nature. 
Hobbes distinguishes between two fundamental laws of nature. 
The first is a consequence of man’s natural pre-political condition 
of “war of every one against every one.”56 From this condition 
Hobbes derives a “general rule of reason” that every man ought to 
seek peace and to defend himself when peace is threatened.57 This 
Hobbes refers to as the “fundamental law of nature.”58 The 
“second law of nature,” which is derived from the first, comprises 
the will to lay down one’s arms on condition that others do the 
same.59 As the foregoing has demonstrated, this contractarian 
bargain is based on self-interest. But, it also reflects the 17th 
century conception of a certain harmony between “reason” and 
“nature.”60 This conception reflected the orthodox Christian 
doctrine of nature as the creation of God, with reason as a God-
given faculty which man uses naturally.61 The laws of nature are 
thus discoverable by reason; indeed, God impels (if not compels) 
man to obey the laws of nature through his irresistible power, 
given that he cannot speak directly to humans.62 
                                                                                                             
 
to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one 
assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, 
unto one will: which is as much to say, to appoint one man, or 
assembly of men, to bear their person; and every one to own, and 
acknowledge himself to be author of whatsoever he that so beareth their 
person, shall act, or cause to be acted, in those things which concern the 
common peace and safety; and therein to submit their wills, every one 
to his will, and their judgments, to his judgment. This is more than 
consent, or concord, it is a real unity of them all, in one and the same 
person. . . .  
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 112 (Michael Oakeshott ed., 3d ed. 1966) (1651). 
See Alan Ryan, Hobbes’s Political Philosophy, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION 
TO HOBBES’S LEVIATHAN 208, 226 (Tom Sorell ed., 1996) (discussing how in 
political society man contracts “out of war and into peace”). 
 56. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 85. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. ALOYSIUS MARTINICH, THE TWO GODS OF LEVIATHAN 121 (1992). 
 61. “God declareth his laws . . . by dictates of natural reason . . . [H]e 
governeth . . . by the dictates of natural right reason.” HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, 
supra note 55, at 233–34. 
 62. Id. at 234; Gauthier, supra note 46, at 435; see also Tom Sorell, 
Hobbes’s Moral Philosophy, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HOBBES’S 
LEVIATHAN 150 (Patricia Springborg ed., 2007). Sorrel asserts that the basic 
symmetry between God’s commandments and man’s self-interest is a “master-
precept” running through Hobbes’s thought. It must be noted that I am adopting 
a theistic interpretation of Hobbes’s philosophy. Although this interpretation 
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The political sovereign is created by covenant, the means 
whereby men extend their obligations by taking new ones upon 
themselves.63 Hobbes describes the nature of this covenant by 
stating that it is,  
. . . as if every man should say to every man, I authorize 
and give up my right of governing myself, to this man, or to 
this assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up 
thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like 
manner.64  
This, concludes Hobbes, is the creation “of that great 
LEVIATHAN or rather, to speak more reverently, of that mortal god, 
to which we owe under the Immortal God, our peace and 
defence.”65 This kind of sovereignty (i.e. one by agreement among 
the citizens) is called sovereignty by institution.66 The other kind of 
sovereignty referred to by Hobbes is sovereignty by acquisition 
and is one that is established by force.67 The third kind of 
sovereignty is paternal dominion, acquired through tacit consent.68 
Under Hobbes’s doctrine, a political authority is a person or 
body of persons whose decisions must be regarded as though they 
were reasonable by virtue of their source.69 However, the citizen 
does not take moral responsibility for the decisions of the 
                                                                                                             
 
seems to have the greatest currency in scholarly circles, it is by no means the 
only one. A number of scholars have argued that Hobbes was an atheist at heart 
and that his numerous references to God and to divine law are merely rhetorical 
tropes designed to appease his critics (or the Church) or are ironic declarations 
to suggest the opposite of what they seem to say at face value. Perhaps the 
strongest argument for the atheistic view is the argument that Hobbes’s 
materialist philosophy (which conceives of the entire universe to be made of 
bodies) does not admit the possibility of a non-material being such as the 
Christian God. See Douglas M. Jesseph, Hobbes’s Atheism, 26 MIDWEST STUD. 
PHIL. 140, 144, 150, 151 (2002); see also DAVID BERMAN, A HISTORY OF 
ATHEISM IN BRITAIN: FROM HOBBES TO RUSSELL (1988); GAUTHIER, THE LOGIC 
OF LEVIATHAN, supra note 47; SAMUEL I. MINTZ, THE HUNTING OF LEVIATHAN: 
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY REACTIONS TO THE NATURALISM AND MORAL 
PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS HOBBES (1962). 
 63. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 112. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 113. 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. at 130 (describing paternal dominion as acquired “from the child’s 
consent, either express, or by other sufficient arguments declared”). 
 69. See id. at 113 (defining a political union or “commonwealth by 
institution” as one in which one person or assembly of persons is given the 
authority to represent every one).  
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sovereign, for under Hobbes’s doctrine, one person cannot take 
moral responsibility of the sinful acts of another.70 Yet by holding 
that the decisions of the sovereign are to be regarded as inherently 
reasonable and to be binding on all subjects except the sovereign,71 
Hobbes sweeps away the entire notion of constitutional guarantees 
or restrictions laid upon the exercise of sovereignty by that law. 
However, it should be remembered that under Hobbes’s scheme 
the authority of the civil sovereign is explained as deriving neither 
from the civil law nor from sovereign command, but from the 
authorization of the actions of the sovereign by each citizen, so that 
all forms of government are ultimately democratic.72  
With his transfer of rights and authorization of the sovereign’s 
actions, the individual under Hobbes’s theory undertakes an 
obligation of non-resistance to the sovereign and indemnifies the 
sovereign from accountability to the individual.73 Apart from 
acquiring this moral status, the sovereign must also be allowed to 
have a power sufficient to keep the subject in awe so that the 
former may not only occupy a privileged position, but may also 
elicit active cooperation from the subject.74  
Whatever the type of sovereignty, the power of the sovereign 
cannot be transferred to another without the former’s consent;75 the 
obligation of non-resistance always prevails.76 In each case the 
sovereign remains the sole judge of what is necessary for peace. 
                                                                                                             
 70. THOMAS HOBBES, DE CIVE 129–30 (Sterling Lamprecht ed., 1949) 
(1642) (“Whatsoever any man doeth against his conscience, is a sin; for he who 
doth so, contemns the law. But we must distinguish. That is my sin indeed, 
which committing I do believe to be my sin; but what I believe to be another 
man’s sin, I may sometimes do without any sign of mine. For if I be commanded 
to do that which is a sin in him who commands me, if I do it, and he that 
commands me be by right lord over me, I sin not . . . .”).  
 71. See HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 115; see also HOBBES, DE 
CIVE, supra note 70, at 142 (“[T]hey who among men obtain the chiefest 
dominion, cannot be subject to laws properly so called . . . .”). 
 72. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 116 (explaining the 
authorization of the sovereign’s actions by each citizen). 
 73. See id. at 115 (“[B]ecause every subject is . . . author of all the actions, 
and judgments of the sovereign instituted; it follows, that whatsoever he doth, it 
can be no injury to any of his subjects; nor ought he to be by any of them 
accused of injustice.”). 
 74. See HOWARD WARRENDER, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF HOBBES 
112 (1961) (discussing Hobbes’s theory of the sovereign’s power, yet remarking 
that Hobbes’s sovereign also relied upon the cooperation of his citizens). 
 75. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 113 (“And consequently they 
that have already instituted a commonwealth, being thereby bound by the 
covenant, to own the actions, and judgments of one, cannot lawfully make a new 
covenant among themselves, to be obedient to any other, in anything 
whatsoever, without his permission.”). 
 76. Id. at 114. 
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He is the sole legislator and the supreme judge of controversies 
and of the times and occasions of war and peace.77 The sovereign 
also has the “right inter-alia to choose magistrates, commanders, 
ministers and to determine rewards and punishments.”78  
IV. THE UTILITARIAN SCOPE OF SOVEREIGN OBLIGATION 
Hobbes’s theory of “covenant” requires unquestioning 
obedience by the subject to the commands of his sovereign.79 If the 
command is in conflict with natural law, and is therefore 
iniquitous, the iniquity concerns only the sovereign who issued the 
command, and he, according to Hobbes, will have to answer for it 
to God.80 On the question of the relationship between natural law 
and civil law, Hobbes does not go as far as other natural law 
philosophers who have asserted that not only is civil law “derived” 
from natural law, but is invalid if it is considered to be in conflict 
with higher law.81  
Declares Hobbes: 
The office of the sovereign, be it a monarch or an 
assembly, consisteth in the end, for which he was trusted 
with the sovereign power, namely the procuration of the 
safety of the people; to which he is obliged by the law of 
nature, and to render an account thereof to God, the author 
of that law, and to none but him.82 
                                                                                                             
 77. Id. at 117–18.  
 78. Id. at 118; see also WARRENDER, supra note 74, at 125. 
 79. See HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 114–15 (describing the 
power of the sovereign within the covenant). 
 80. A. E. Taylor, The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes, 13 PHIL. 406, 414 (1938). 
 81. Augustine is an example of a natural law philosopher who held that civil 
law is invalid if in conflict with higher law: Non videtur esse lex quae justa non 
fuerit (It would seem that a law that is not just is not law). ST. AUGUSTINE, ST. 
AUGUSTINE ON FREE WILL (Carrol Mason Sparrow trans.), 49 UNIVERSITY OF 
VIRGINIA STUDIES 9 (1947). See also RONALD HAMOWY, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF LIBERTARIANISM 351 (2008). 
 82. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 219 (emphasis added). In De 
Cive, Hobbes similarly echoes the duty of the sovereign to submit to divine law: 
Now all the duties of rulers are contained in this one sentence, the 
safety of the people is the supreme law. For although they who among 
men obtain the chiefest dominion, cannot be subject to laws properly so 
called, that is to say, to the will of men, because to be chief, and 
subject, are contradictories; yet is it their duty in all things, as much as 
possibly they can, to yield obedience unto right reason, which is the 
natural, moral, and divine law. But because dominions were constituted 
for peace’s sake, and peace was sought after for safety’s sake, he, who 
being placed in authority, shall use his power otherwise than to the 
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Although no single individual or human court can question the 
validity of the civil law, even if it is considered to conflict with the 
natural law, Hobbes’s doctrine does not grant the sovereign 
absolute and limitless powers.83 Hobbes’s sovereign is accountable 
in equity to God and must therefore strictly observe the natural (or 
moral) law. He is bound to command and forbid always with a 
view to promoting the overall public good so that everyone may 
“live delightfully,” ends that are entirely secular and utilitarian 
consequentialist in nature.84 
In De Cive Hobbes also requires that the sovereign must not 
restrain the “harmless liberty” of the subject by imposing 
superfluous, inadequate or unnecessarily severe penalties or by 
tolerating corruption among his judges.85 All such misconduct is 
iniquity and sin.86 It is as if the sovereign was bound by a divine 
covenant not to break the natural law in the same way that the 
covenant in civil society is to obey without question the civil 
law—the breach of either covenant leads to sanctions against the 
law breakerthe sanction under the former is supernatural in 
essence while that under the latter is secular or temporal in nature. 
Yet the supernatural sanction against the sovereign is grounded on 
an entirely secular and utilitarian purpose, thus placing Hobbes 
squarely in the utilitarian consequentialist camp of the 
deontological/consequentialist divide.87 The accountability of the 
                                                                                                             
 
safety of the people, will act against the reasons of peace, that is to say, 
against the laws of nature. 
HOBBES, DE CIVE, supra note 70, at 142. Here again one sees the familiar 
seventeenth century conflation of “reason,” “nature” and God. See supra text 
accompanying notes 60–62. 
 83. See HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 172–89 (noting that the 
sovereign enjoys vast power and may even violate the law of nature; however, 
Hobbes notes that the sovereign is subject to “equity,” which is the higher 
(natural) law of God). 
 84. HOBBES, DE CIVE, supra note 70, at 143. Indeed, Hobbes devotes an 
entire chapter in DE CIVE titled “Concerning the Duties of Them Who Bear 
Rule,” at 141–54, and in LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 117–20. Hobbes charges 
the sovereign with a variety of mundane tasks such as of providing for the 
common peace and defense of society, the promulgation of rules of property, 
criminal laws and punishments, the provision of a judicial system and the 
appointment of counselors, ministers, magistrates and other officers. 
 85. HOBBES, DE CIVE, supra note 70, at 152–54 (“It is a great part of that 
liberty, which is harmless to civil government, and necessary for each subject to 
live happily, that there be no penalties dreaded, but what they may both foresee 
and look for . . . .”). See also id. at 151–54. 
 86. See id. at 153 (noting that sovereigns “sin, if they entertain any other 
measure in arbitrary punishment, than the public benefit”). 
 87. ISAAK DORE, EPISTEMOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW 183 (2007). 
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sovereign is not a good in itself; it is a good because it serves the 
utilitarian consequentialist goal of good governance.88 
V. THE CONSEQUENTIALIST NECESSITY OF THE DIVINE COVENANT 
Taylor argues that it is contradictory to say on one hand that 
Hobbes’s sovereign is guilty of iniquity (by oppressing his 
subjects) when, on the other hand, the original covenant imposes 
no limits on sovereign power.89 But if the idea of a divine covenant 
(together with its utilitarian consequentialist underpinnings) is 
accepted, Taylor’s concern with a covenant between sovereign and 
subject becomes irrelevant.90 
Under Hobbes’s doctrine, not only is it irrelevant to search for 
a covenant between the sovereign and his subjects for purposes of 
deciding the validity of the acts of the sovereign, but infractions by 
the sovereign of natural law precepts are breaches of a covenant (a 
divine covenant) and every such breach is by definition iniquitous 
                                                                                                             
 88. See discussion infra Part VII; see also HOBBES, DE CIVE, supra note 70, 
at 22 (“We do not . . . by nature seek society for its own sake, but that we may 
receive some honour or profit from it . . . .”). 
 89. Taylor’s argument is essentially that no limits can be  imposed on a 
power that is by definition illimitable: 
Now since Hobbes also attempts to reduce all iniquity in the end to 
breach of an express or implied contract, and since he also, as we all 
know, makes it so capital a point that the parties to the original contract 
by which civil society was created are not the “sovereign” and the 
“subject” (who only come into existence in virtue of the contract itself), 
but the individual items of a “dissolute multitude” which is not yet a 
society and has no legal personality, we might find a difficulty here. If 
the original contract, which must not be broken, imposed no conditions 
of any kind upon the future sovereign’s arbitrary exercise of the power 
to command and forbid, how can he be said to be guilty of iniquity if he 
chooses to issue a host of grandmotherly commands, to enforce them 
savagely, or to neglect enforcing them, or if he winks at the bribery of 
his judges? He never covenanted with his subjects that he would not do 
these things; if he does them, then he breaks no “covenant,” and cannot 
be iniquitous, if iniquity and breach of contract are the same thing. 
Hence it is not unnatural that Hobbes should have been suspected of 
meaning no more by all his talk about the “duties” of sovereigns than 
that a sovereign who acts in the ways he condemns is likely to draw 
unpleasant consequences on himself.  
Taylor, supra note 80, at 415–16. 
 90. It is of no consequence then to argue, as does Taylor, that since the 
sovereign never covenanted with his subjects, he cannot be accused of breaking 
a covenant (or for that matter of being iniquitous). Id. at 416. 
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(contrary to Taylor’s interpretation of Hobbes) in the same way as 
what the civil law forbids is by definition unjust.91  
This argument is, however, not without difficulty. It may be 
argued that although it is proper to say that what the civil law 
forbids is “by definition” unjust because the forbidden act would 
then, presumably, be defined under the civil law, not only is the 
“covenant” undefined but also even those acts forbidden to the 
sovereign are undefined.  
The argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, even the 
civil “covenant” is postulated rather than defined so that the lack of 
definition of the “divine covenant” is not indicative of its non-
existence,92 and second, Hobbes himself provides ample guidelines 
to judge the equity or iniquity of particular acts of the sovereign. In 
De Cive, he devotes an entire chapter, “Concerning the Duties of 
those who bear Rule.”93 In this chapter Hobbes argues that a prince 
violates his duty by unduly restraining the liberty of subjects, 
enacting a multiplicity of superfluous laws, imposing penalties on 
subjects that are either inadequate or too severe, or by conniving 
with the corruption of judges through bribes.94 Furthermore, 
Hobbes’s sovereign must ensure the “safety” and general welfare 
of his subjects (“establish the welfare of the most part”), govern 
through laws that are “universal,” and ensure the general happiness 
(“contentment”) of all.95 
These considerations are, in fact, consistent with the last part of 
Taylor’s above-quoted criticism of Hobbes. It reads as follows: 
“Hence it is not unnatural that Hobbes should have been suspected 
of meaning no more by all this talk about the ‘duties’ of sovereigns 
                                                                                                             
 91. See HOBBES, DE CIVE, supra note 70, at 153 (“But where the 
punishment is defined, either by a law prescribed, as when it is set down in plain 
words, that he that shall do thus or thus, shall suffer so and so; or by practice, as 
when the penalty, (not by any law prescribed, but arbitrary from the beginning) 
is afterward determined by the punishment of the first delinquent (for natural 
equity commands that equal transgressors be equally punished); there to impose 
a greater penalty than is defined by the law, is against the law of nature.”). 
 92. See HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 114 (noting that men 
“covenant” when they form a government, but not precisely defining this 
covenant). 
 93. See HOBBES, DE CIVE, supra note 70, at 141–54. 
 94. Id. at 152–54. 
 95. See id. at 142–43; see also THOMAS HOBBES, HUMAN NATURE AND DE 
CORPORE POLITICO 172–73 (JCA Gaskin ed., Oxford 1994) (1640); HOBBES, 
LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 219 (“But by safety here, is not meant a bare 
preservation, but also all other contentments of life, which every man by lawful 
industry, without danger, or hurt to the commonwealth, shall acquire to 
himself.”). 
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than that a sovereign who acts in the ways he condemns is likely to 
draw unpleasant consequences on himself.”96  
The reference to “unpleasant consequences” clearly 
incorporates the idea of some kind of sanction, and, since this 
sanction cannot be applied by secular authority (for under 
Hobbes’s scheme there is no temporal authority beyond the 
sovereign), the sanction must be of spiritual or divine character.97 
If this is so then it provides another reason for reading into 
Hobbes’s scheme the concept of a divine covenant as defined 
above.  
This interpretation is further supported by Hobbes’s own 
distinction between “counsel” and “law”:  
[C]ounsel is a precept in which the reason of my obeying it 
is taken from the thing itself which is advised but command 
is a precept in which the cause of my obedience depends on 
the will of the commander. For it is not properly said that 
thus I will and thus I command, except the will stands for a 
reason. Now when obedience is yielded to the laws, not for 
the thing itself, but by reason of the adviser’s will, the law 
is not a counsel but a command, and is defined thus: law is 
the command of the person, whether man or court, whose 
precept contains the reason of obedience . . . is duty, what 
by counsel is free-will.98  
Chapter XIII of De Cive (“Concerning the Duties of those who 
bear Rule”) must be read with this distinction in mind. Hobbes 
could not have used the word “Duties” to imply “free-will” or 
something other than law. However, in spite of this, Taylor makes 
this rather bewildering statement:  
If Hobbes had meant, then, the sovereign who does the 
various things which he condemns in a sovereign is acting 
in an ill-advised way, doing what he is likely hereafter to be 
sorry for, and nothing more, he ought, according to his own 
definitions, to have called the ‘precepts’ of De Cive, XIII, 
simply counsels not duties.99 
                                                                                                             
 96. Taylor, supra note 80, at 416. 
 97. For an endorsement of the notion that the sovereign is immune from 
secular sanction, see M.M. Goldsmith, Hobbes on Law, in THE CAMBRIDGE 
COMPANION TO HOBBES 274, 278 (1996) (“For Hobbes the sovereign is not only 
supreme but also unlimited.”). 
 98. HOBBES, DE CIVE, supra note 70, at 155. 
 99. Taylor, supra note 80, at 416. 
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If “counsel” is “free-will” and if the reason for obeying it is 
taken “from the thing itself which is advised”100 then it is clear that 
such reason cannot exist in anything external to “the thing itself.” 
The reason cannot therefore exist in natural law. Thus if all the acts 
of the sovereign are based on counsel and free-will, the reason for 
his acts cannot be found in natural law. The logical conclusion of 
Taylor’s argument is that this natural or moral law, which Hobbes 
himself regards as having a brooding omnipresence,101 is reduced 
to a meaningless concept because its raison d’etre is negated.  
It must further be borne in mind that Taylor asserts that 
breaches of the above “precepts” by a sovereign are “likely to draw 
unpleasant consequences on himself.”102 If the “unpleasant 
consequences” ought to be understood as implying divine 
sanctions, the reason for obeying any precept is external to it, i.e., 
is based on fear of “unpleasant consequences” for which the 
sovereign, to use Taylor’s words, “will have to answer . . . to 
God.”103 It becomes obvious therefore that the sovereign is himself 
bound by the “precepts” of his rule, that each precept is a duty 
rather than “counsel,” because the reason for obeying it is not in 
the thing itself which is advised but because every duty is, under 
Hobbes’s scheme, a command or a law “of that person (whether 
man or court) whose precept contains in it the reason of the 
obedience. . . .”104  
Having implicitly denied that the reason for obeying sovereign 
duties lies in an external source, Taylor proceeds to locate what he 
considers to be the real source of obedience of “precepts” or 
“counsels” mentioned above.105 His argument is highly cogent, but 
it appears to suggest that the source or reason for obedience is 
essentially secular in nature, thereby again denying the law of 
nature one of its chief raisons d’etre.  
Being of the view that Hobbes had not “laid all the stress he 
should have done”106 on certain aspects of the (civil) “covenant,” 
Taylor proceeds to restate (and to some extent reconstruct) 
Hobbes’s theory of the covenant as follows: The sovereign is 
                                                                                                             
 100. HOBBES, DE CIVE, supra note 70, at 155; see supra text accompanying 
note 98 (quoting the relevant passage from De Cive). 
 101. See HOBBES, DE CIVE, supra note 70, at 59 (describing the laws of 
nature as “nothing else but certain conclusions understood by reason”); see also 
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 102–03 (describing the laws of nature as 
universal precepts of reason understood by all men). 
 102. Taylor, supra note 80, at 416. 
 103. Id. at 413. 
 104. HOBBES, DE CIVE, supra note 70, at 155. 
 105. See Taylor, supra note 80, at 416–17. 
 106. Id. at 417. 
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created by a voluntary transference to him of what, in the “state of 
nature,” had been the personal right of each of his future 
subjects.107 What is transferred by each subject “to the sovereign . . . 
[is] the right to prescribe at his discretion” what the subjects can do 
and cannot do.108 However, Taylor points out, “the purpose of this 
transference [is] the promotion of the safety and commodious 
living of each (subject).”109 The subject does not renounce his 
claim to safety and comfort when he renounced his claim to judge 
at his own discretion how it may be attained.110 The “renunciation” 
is not made by a contract between the sovereign “of the one part” 
and the “people” of the other part, but by a contract between each 
individual man and every other, in which the sovereign is a 
beneficiary, but not a party.111 Taylor quotes Hobbes: “In the 
conveyance of right, the will is requisite not only of him that 
conveys, but of him also that accepts it. If either be wanting, the 
right remains.”112 
In this way, Taylor asserts the sovereign is a “beneficiary under 
the bargain” to whom the “rights” of each subject are transferred 
and “he accepts the transfer” and thereby undertakes that the 
powers transferred to him “are to be exercised for the preservation 
and commodity of all” subjects.113 This, however, does not affect 
the conclusion that no subject can call the sovereign to account for 
his actions. This is because all subjects are deemed to have 
authorized the sovereign to issue whatever commands he chooses 
and cannot question any of his commands on the ground that his 
commands are not conducive to the ends for which the transfer of 
right was made. This, in turn, flows from the fact that each subject 
has agreed that it was the sovereign who was to be the sole judge 
on such matters.114  
By “accepting” the rights transferred to him the sovereign 
becomes a “party” to the covenant.115 Taylor’s restatement thus 
leads to the following conclusions:  
(1) that the sovereign is a party to every contract between each 
individual citizen and every other;  
(2) that as such he has certain rights and duties arising directly 
from the totality of contracts;  
                                                                                                             
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. (quoting HOBBES, DE CIVE, supra note 70, at 34). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 417–18. 
 115. Id. at 418. 
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(3) that each contract is secular in nature;  
(4) that one of the sovereign’s duties is not to commit 
iniquity;116 
(5) that the sovereign must promote “the safety and 
commodious living” of all subjects;117 
(6) that an act which goes contrary to this duty is iniquitous.118  
Taylor thus asserts:  
Hence iniquity on [the sovereign’s] part, too, though not an 
offence of which any court can take cognizance, could be 
brought, at a pinch, without any departure from the main 
lines of Hobbes’s thought, under the head of breach of the 
great law that “men perform their covenants once made.”119  
However, contrary to Taylor’s claim, this is in fact a serious 
departure from the main lines of Hobbes’s thought for numerous 
reasons: First, as Hobbes himself was shown to have pointed out 
earlier, a secular source can define only that which is “just” and 
“unjust” whereas the distinction between “equity” and “iniquity” is 
made under the natural law.120 It is therefore misleading to assert 
an act is “iniquitous” because it prevents “safety and commodious 
living.” That act may be iniquitous only if any of the “duties” of 
the sovereign under natural law (as summarized above) were 
breached. Second, Taylor suggests that the duty of the sovereign 
arises from the principle that men must keep their covenants once 
made;121 it is obvious that Taylor is referring to the civil covenant 
to which he (Taylor) has made the sovereign a “party.” The source 
of the duty appears then, to be entirely secular, thus rendering 
superfluous all those duties of the sovereign which Hobbes asserts 
as flowing from the natural law and which he describes in Chapter 
XIII of De Cive.122 Third, there appears to be a glaring 
inconsistency between Hobbes’s view (as restated by Taylor) that 
the sovereign cannot be called to account for his acts to any of his 
subjects123 and Taylor’s earlier statement that a sovereign who 
contravenes his duties is likely to draw unpleasant consequences 
for himself.124 As argued above, this statement is not objectionable 
                                                                                                             
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 417. 
 118. See id. at 418. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 187. 
 121. See Taylor, supra note 80, at 417–18. 
 122. See HOBBES, DE CIVE, supra note 70, at 141–55 (outlining the 
sovereign’s duties which flow from the natural law).  
 123. Taylor, supra note 80, at 417. 
 124. See id. at 416. 
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if by “consequences” one means divine sanctions.125 However, by 
virtue of Taylor’s secular contract to which even the sovereign is a 
“party,”126 it would seem that the consequences are also secular, in 
which case the logical inference is that the sovereign is answerable 
to his subjects, although the way in which he is so answerable is 
left undefined by Taylor.127 If this is so, it contradicts the view 
(which even Taylor accepts as being properly attributable to 
Hobbes)128 that Hobbes’s sovereign is not accountable in any way 
to any secular authority. Fourth, the theory that the sovereign is 
party to each covenant between each individual and every other is 
inconsistent with the following statement of Hobbes in Leviathan:  
[B]ecause the right of bearing the person of [the citizens], 
is given to him they make sovereign, by covenant only of 
one to another, and not of him to any of them; there can 
happen no breach of covenant on the part of the sovereign; 
and consequently none of his subjects, by any pretence of 
forfeiture, can be freed from his subjection. That he which 
is made sovereign maketh no covenant with his subjects 
beforehand, is manifest; because either he must make it 
with the whole multitude, as one party to the covenant; or 
he must make a several covenant with every man. With the 
whole, as one party, it is impossible; because as yet they 
are not one person: and if he make so many several 
covenants as there be men, those covenants after he hath 
the sovereignty are void; because what act soever can be 
pretended by any one of them for breach thereof, is the act 
both of himself, and of all the rest, because done in the 
person, and by the right of every one of them in 
particular.129  
Fifth, as seen above, under Hobbes’s concept of sovereignty the 
citizens contract among themselves with a view “to appoint[ing] 
one man, or assembly of men, to bear their person.”130 Thus the 
sovereign cannot be either a party or a beneficiary under a 
covenant to which the subject is a party, for since the sovereign 
bears the person of the subject, the sovereign would be 
covenanting with himself. Finally, under Taylor’s theory, the 
sovereign would have to be regarded as owing an obligation to his 
                                                                                                             
 125. See supra text accompanying note 91. 
 126. See supra text accompanying note 115. 
 127. See Taylor, supra note 80, at 415–18. 
 128. Id. at 416. 
 129. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 114. 
 130. Id. at 112; see supra text accompanying notes 55–69. 
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people, on the premise that the sovereign acquires rights and 
obligations from the contract between himself and each citizen.131 
Hobbes consistently denies that the sovereign owes duties to his 
people and instead asserts that the sovereign is not accountable to 
his subjects.132 Moreover, such a theory would also lead to the 
conclusion that if all the citizens agreed, they should be capable of 
dissolving their respective contracts with each other so that their 
obligation to obey the sovereign—which arises from these 
covenants—would be caduc. Such a conclusion is again patently 
inconsistent with the most fundamental tenets of Hobbes’s concept 
of sovereignty and civil obligation.  
The divine covenant, then, not only avoids the above 
inconsistencies and culs de sac, but also remains faithful to 
Hobbes’s goal of ensuring that the sovereign diligently focuses on 
providing the “contentments of life” at the society-wide level. 
VI. CONSEQUENTIALISM AND DEISM 
The argument so far has been that it is preferable not to hold 
Hobbes’s sovereign a party to any secular contract but, instead, to 
hold him accountable in equity to God with natural law as the sole 
source of this obligation; that the divine covenant best serves 
Hobbes’s utilitarian political agenda; that there is nothing logically 
inconsistent between postulating the existence of a divine covenant 
between sovereign and God and the body of Hobbes’s utilitarian 
doctrine; that in fact this conclusion is implicit in Hobbes’s theory 
of obligation relating to the sovereign; and finally, that the 
“precepts” which the sovereign obeys are “commands” rather than 
“counsels.”  
Surprisingly enough, Taylor ultimately endorses this thesis: “If 
the fulfilling of the law of nature is a duty in the sovereign, it 
follows that the law of nature is a command, and a command the 
reason for obedience whereto is that it is the precept of a ‘person’ 
with the right to command.”133 Taylor then inquires what kind of 
person is it whose commands are to be obeyed, and proceeds to 
answer the question as follows: It is “[n]ot the ‘natural person’ of 
any man, since Hobbes denies the existence of any universal 
monarch of the earth; not a ‘court’ composed of many ‘natural 
persons’ since there is no such ‘court’ with jurisdiction over the 
                                                                                                             
 131. See Taylor, supra note 80, at 418. 
 132. See HOBBES, DE CIVE, supra note 70, at 142; HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, 
supra note 55, at 115. 
 133. Taylor, supra note 80, at 418. 
842 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72 
 
 
 
independent princes of the world.”134 He then concludes 
significantly: “I can only make Hobbes’s statements consistent 
with one another by supposing that he meant quite seriously what 
he so often says, that the ‘natural law’ is the command of God, and 
to be obeyed because it is God’s command.”135 In another passage 
Taylor states, “in no other way can we make his explicit statements 
about the connection between the notions of a duty, a command, 
and a law inherent with each other. A certain kind of theism is 
absolutely necessary to make the theory work.”136  
It may be further pointed out that Hobbes maintains a 
dichotomy between subjects and sovereign on one hand and 
sovereign and God on the other. At the first level Hobbes’s 
position has already been described.137 At the second level Hobbes 
states: “The inequality of subjects, proceedeth from the acts of 
sovereign power; and therefore has no more place in the presence 
of the sovereign, that is to say, in a court of justice, than the 
inequality between kings and their subjects, in the presence of the 
King of kings.”138 Subsequently Hobbes observes that 
[T]he same law that dictateth to men that have no civil 
government, what they ought to do, and what to avoid in 
regard to one another, dictateth the same to 
commonwealths, that is, to the consciences of sovereign 
princes and sovereign assemblies; there being no court of 
natural justice but in the conscience only: where not man, 
but God reigneth . . .139  
Not only is the sovereign conscience reliant on divine inspiration 
but, as Hobbes points out, the sovereign is accountable to God:  
The office of the sovereign, be it a monarch or an 
assembly, consisteth in the end for which he was trusted 
with sovereign power, namely, the procuration of “the 
safety of the people”; to which he is obliged by the law of 
Nature, and to render an account thereof to God, the author 
of that law, and to none but Him.140 
This should be sufficient evidence of Hobbes’s thought to rebut 
the countless misinterpretations of his doctrine, some of which 
were discussed above. A common misinterpretation arises from 
                                                                                                             
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 420. 
 137. See supra text accompanying notes 55–78.  
 138. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 226. 
 139. Id. at 232. 
 140. Id. at 219. 
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Hobbes’s assertion of the “inequality of subjects” before the 
sovereign and their inability to question his acts. It has often been 
wrongly concluded from this that a de facto ruler is always 
justified in all his acts; that since the distinction between good and 
bad arises from the dictates of princes, the commands of princes 
are ipso facto the criterion of right and wrong for those whom they 
are strong enough to command; that a ruler, being himself the 
source of morality, cannot be immoral.141 This is one of the trends 
which is representative of “Hobbism.”142 The view that Hobbes’s 
sovereign is incapable of immorality has already been shown to be 
erroneous.143 
Another popular trend in “Hobbism” is that it is futile to appeal 
to law for protection of popular rights.144 In support of this theory, 
it may be argued that not only are there no popular rights, but since 
the sovereign is placed in a position of such omnipotence vis-a-vis 
his subjects, his personal whim is above the law.145 
                                                                                                             
 141. See Taylor, supra note 80, at 418. 
 142. Sterling P. Lamprecht, Hobbes and Hobbism, 34 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 31, 
33, 46 (1940). 
 143. See supra text accompanying notes 80–83, 86, 103, 120, 136. 
Lamprecht asserts:  
A sovereign, as much as any other man, is subject to the law of nature 
or the dictates of reason; indeed he has greater responsibilities to these 
laws than other men because he is by function the person who “hath 
taken into his hands any portion of, mankind to improve.” “The duty of 
a sovereign,” said Hobbes, “consisteth in the good government of the 
people.” Good government involves provisions to increase the number 
of the people, to preserve peace at home, to provide defense against 
attack from without, and generally to safeguard “the commodity of 
living.”  
Lamprecht, supra note 142, at 47. 
In this way, Lamprecht argues that it is wrong to view Hobbes’s sovereign as 
being incapable of immorality. The ultimate source of obligation is, of course, 
the law of nature and the ultimate duty to account is owed to God. HOBBES, 
HUMAN NATURE AND DE CORPORE POLITICO, supra note 95, at 172 
(“[A]lthough the acts of sovereign power be no injuries to the subjects who have 
consented to the same by their implicit wills, yet when they tend to the hurt of 
the people in general, they be breaches of the law of nature, and of the divine 
law; and consequently, the contrary acts are the duties of sovereigns, and 
required at their hands to the utmost of their endeavor.”). 
 144. Lamprecht, supra note 142, at 33. 
 145. To this argument Lamprecht addresses the following reply:  
[S]ocial problems often admit of no settlement by conference, by 
compromise, by mutual reconciliation of conflicting claims. In such 
cases, we have to choose between open strife and imposed settlement. . . . 
To deny that civil authority is entitled to determine policy even when it 
cannot give adequate demonstration of the soundness of that policy is to 
“make it impossible for any nation in the world to preserve themselves 
from civil war.”  
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However, careful reading of Hobbes shows that this view is 
erroneous for two reasons. First, the obligation of the subject not to 
break his faith once given is grounded in social necessity, for only 
then can “the good of the people” be advanced.146 The need for a 
strong civil authority (i.e. the sovereign) with power to impose 
solutions when compromise is impossible and to prevent civil war 
also appears to be formulated on essentially sociological lines.147 
To quote Lamprecht:  
Some thinkers have put their trust in educational schemes; 
others, in reliance upon natural reason; many in 
supplications for divine grace; some, in appeal to law; a 
credulous few, in the automatic balance of a welter of 
independent forces into an eventual happy synthesis. 
Hobbes brushed such solutions aside. Education is prone to 
corruption; reason is weak; divine grace is a bone of 
contention and a cause of controversy; law is often flouted 
when it is good and enforced when it is bad; . . . The only 
technique of order is discipline, discipline imposed from 
above, discipline that comes from power that cannot be 
challenged by either passion or ignorance. Sovereignty is 
thus the sine qua non, not merely of peace, but also of all 
excellence, both for individual men and for social 
groups.148  
If this interpretation of Hobbes is correct, it follows that his 
thought has strong utilitarian but also sociological undercurrents 
rather progressive for his time.149  
However, sociological and utilitarian arguments were not 
considered by Hobbes to be by themselves sufficient for his theory 
of government.150 Side by side with such arguments is the concept 
of divine accountability.151 All of which combine to provide the 
full consequentialist rationale for the divine covenant.152 This is the 
second reason why a capricious or whimsical sovereign would be 
                                                                                                             
 
Id. at 48 (quoting THOMAS HOBBES, LIBERTY, NECESSITY AND CHANCE 289) 
(emphasis added).  
 146. See HOBBES, HUMAN NATURE AND DE CORPORE POLITICO, supra note 
95, at 111, 172. 
 147. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 109 (describing how Hobbes 
intended the sovereign to keep control of “the natural passions of men” for war).  
 148. Lamprecht, supra note 142, at 39. 
 149. Id.  
 150. HOBBES, DE CIVE, supra note 70, at 141–42.  
 151. See id. (describing the concept of divine accountability). 
 152. Id. 
2012] DECONSTRUCTING HOBBES 845 
 
 
 
incompatible with Hobbesian doctrine. This Lamprecht does not 
sufficiently emphasize.153 Says Hobbes in De Cive:  
For although they who among men obtain their chiefest 
dominion, cannot be subject to laws properly so called, that 
is to say, to the will of men, because to be chief, and 
subject, are contradictories; yet it is their duty in all things, 
as much as possibly they can, to yield obedience unto right 
reason, which is the natural, moral, and divine law.154  
Thus Hobbes’s theory of divine obligation is utilitarian and 
consequentialist in essence. The raison d’etre of this obligation is 
that the sovereign “hath taken into his hands (a) portion of 
mankind to improve.”155 It is not a duty owed in abstracto but has 
as its objective an entirely secular goal. This focus upon utilitarian 
consequentialism is the unifying trend in Hobbes’s doctrine. All 
his main lines of thought on the question of sovereignty and the 
place he assigns it within the wider doctrine of the law of nature 
(with God as its author) show this unity of purpose. The same 
purpose is reflected in the duties assigned by Hobbes to the civil 
sovereign. These duties are outlined next.  
VII. THE CONSEQUENTIALIST DUTIES OF THE SOVEREIGN 
Under Hobbes’s theory of civil society, civil government is 
“not instituted for its own, but for the subjects’ sake.”156 The basic 
concern of the sovereign, according to Hobbes, ought to be the 
preservation of the safety of the people.157 This duty however does 
not relate merely to the preservation of life but also for the means 
to live well.158  
The duties of the sovereign are aimed at securing three inter-
related objectives: 
 
                                                                                                             
 153. See Lamprecht, supra note 142, at 39–42. 
 154. HOBBES, DE CIVE, supra note 70, at 142. 
 155. HOBBES, HUMAN NATURE AND DE CORPORE POLITICO, supra note 95, at 
173. 
 156. HOBBES, DE CIVE, supra note 70, at 142. 
 157. See id. (“Now all the duties of rulers are contained in this one sentence, 
the safety of the people is the supreme law.”). 
 158. See HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 219 (“But by safety here, is 
not meant a bare preservation, but also all other contentments of life, which 
every man by lawful industry, without danger, or hurt to the commonwealth, 
shall acquire to himself.”); HOBBES, DE CIVE, supra note 70, at 143; HOBBES, 
HUMAN NATURE AND DE CORPORE POLITICO, supra note 95, at 172; see also 
WARRENDER, supra note 74, at 181 (discussing the duties of the sovereign). 
846 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72 
 
 
 
A. Security  
The sovereign under Hobbes’s theory must preserve peace 
from both domestic and foreign dangers.159 To this end his duty 
involves the creation and maintenance of adequate armed forces 
and military intelligence, as well as finances to pay for these 
services. The sovereign is also charged with preventing the 
emergence of “perverse doctrines” and political factions in order to 
forestall acts of sedition.160 Thus says Hobbes in De Cive: 
[S]ome things there are which dispose the minds of men to 
sedition, others which move and quicken them so disposed. 
Among those which dispose them, we have reckoned in the 
first place certain perverse doctrines. It is therefore the duty 
of those who have the chief authority, to root those out of 
the minds of men, not by commanding, but by teaching; not 
by terror of penalties, but by perspicuity of reasons.161 
These sovereign duties constitute another example of utilitarian 
consequentialism since they are obviously concerned with the 
creation of those conditions in society that promote human 
flourishing on the basis of mutual security. The emphasis on 
“teaching” and on “perspicuity of reasons” and the avoidance of 
the “terror of penalties” all suggest that the Hobbesian sovereign is 
not the brutish dictator that he is sometimes made out to be, and 
that the citizen is not the hapless subject who lives in abject fear 
for his life. 
B. Prosperity  
It is also the responsibility of the sovereign to pass laws which 
will lead to the increase of wealth, deter needless waste of 
resources, and encourage thrift and industry.162 Examples given by 
Hobbes are laws that encourage husbandry and fishing and laws 
“whereby all inordinate expense, as well in meats as in clothes, and 
universally in all things which are consumed with usage, is 
forbidden.”163 Hobbes contemplates the welfare of all subjects 
                                                                                                             
 159. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 116; HOBBES, DE CIVE, supra 
note 70, at 144; HOBBES, HUMAN NATURE AND DE CORPORE POLITICO, supra 
note 95, at 173; see also WARRENDER, supra note 74, at 181. 
 160. HOBBES, DE CIVE, supra note 70, at 145–46, 149; see also 
WARRENDER, supra note 74, at 181–82.  
 161. HOBBES, DE CIVE, supra note 70, at 146.  
 162. See id. at 150–51; see also HOBBES, HUMAN NATURE AND DE CORPORE 
POLITICO, supra note 95, at 174. 
 163. HOBBES, DE CIVE, supra note 70, at 151. 
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the able-bodied as well as the poor and the weak: “And whereas 
many men, by accident inevitable, become unable to maintain 
themselves by their labour; they ought not to be left to the charity 
of private persons, but to be provided for, as far forth as the 
necessities of nature require, by the laws of the commonwealth.”164 
C. Equality of Treatment and Liberty  
In Leviathan Hobbes says that:  
The safety of the people, requireth further, from him, or 
them that have sovereign power, that justice be equally 
administered to all degrees of people, that is, that as well 
the rich and mighty, as poor and obscure persons . . . ; so as 
the great, may have no greater hope of impunity, when they 
do violence . . . to the meaner sort, than when one of these, 
does the like to one of them: for in this consisteth equity to 
which, as being a precept of the law of nature, a sovereign 
is as much subject, as any of the meanest of his people.165 
In addition to promoting equal administration of justice, the 
sovereign is also required to distribute burdens equally to all 
subjects:  
Now in this place we understand an equality, not of money, 
but of burthen, that is to say, an equality of reason between 
the burthens and the benefits. For although all equally 
enjoy peace, yet the benefits springing from thence are not 
equal to all; for some get greater possessions, others less; 
and again, some consume less, others more . . . subjects 
ought to contribute to the public, according to the rate of 
what they gain . . .166 
The sovereign must also not enact unnecessary laws, for these 
may harm the liberty of the individual;167 he must ensure the 
proper application of rewards and punishments and, finally, must 
ensure that his counselors, judges and other public officers are not 
corrupt.168 
                                                                                                             
 164. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 227; see also WARRENDER, 
supra note 74, at 182 (noting that Hobbes’s individualism does not imply 
laissez-faire economics). 
 165. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 225; see also WARRENDER, 
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It is thus quite clear that all the duties of the sovereign 
regarding the promotion of security, prosperity, equality and 
libertythe basis or reason for which is the good of the 
community, an entirely secular goalare derived from the natural 
law of God. It is equally clear that if the sovereign fails to promote 
these duties, he is accountable in equity to God 
VIII. CONSEQUENTIALISM, THE STATE OF NATURE AND THE LAW OF 
NATURE 
Hobbes uses the idea of a “state of nature” as an analytic 
device to reinforce the foregoing principles.169 For Hobbes, the 
state of nature was not a historical period from which man moved 
away; rather it was an ever-present potential danger in every 
society.170 Without proper vigilance, even civil society can 
“degenerate” into civil war.171 Strong civil authority was the best, 
if not the only, safeguard against this danger.172 In fact, Hobbes 
specifically observes of the state of nature that “[I]t may per 
adventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor condition of 
war as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over all the 
world: but there are many places, where they live so now. . . .”173  
Adopting the position of Woodridge,174 Lamprecht suggests 
that the state of nature is analogous to the scientific description of a 
body as continuing in a state of rest or of uniform motion unless 
influenced by outside forces.175 Actually, of course, there is no 
such uniformity because all bodies are continually influenced by 
external forces.176 So Hobbes’s concept of man in the state of 
nature suggests that this state does not and did not exist in reality; 
that all men are continually influenced by social forces which lead 
to the establishment of the state (the great leviathan). The state is 
                                                                                                             
 169. Lamprecht, supra note 142, at 40–41. 
 170. Id. at 41. 
 171. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 83; see also Lamprecht, supra 
note 142, at 41.  
 172. Lamprecht, supra note 142, at 41; KAVKA, supra note 35, at 123 (“The 
state of nature is used, in Hobbesian theory, as a model of what would happen to 
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an “artificial” body (but a body nevertheless) which men establish 
as “a consequence of their natural motions in conflict.”177 The 
concept implies the sociability of man, yet at the same time it 
throws into sharp relief the gravity of the problem of securing a 
stable and good society since men are viewed as not easily 
submitting to discipline; they are in continual need of being 
controlled.178 
Yet it is wrong to assert that the strong civil authority 
advocated by Hobbes is such that the sovereign is incapable of 
immorality. Under Hobbes’s doctrine, justice and right begin only 
where law exists.179 Hobbes is therefore speaking in legal, not in 
moral terms, so that:  
[I]n the absence of law, might makes right, not in the sense 
that might proves wisdom or virtue to be resident in him 
who exercises the might, but in the sense that might, when 
irresistible, is the beginning of a regime in which the 
distinction between ruler and subjects is emerging . . . .180  
It is clear therefore that Hobbes’s concept of man in a state of 
nature is intimately linked to the utilitarian/consequentialist goals 
of his theories of sovereignty and sovereign obligation, all of 
which are offered by Hobbes as the solution of what he perceived 
to be an essentially social and empirical problem.181 
It is this “empiricist” approach which led Hobbes to conclude 
that civil government cannot coexist with a state of nature; this is 
indeed an ordinance of what Hobbes calls “the second law of 
nature.”182 Where there is no central power in society which can 
guarantee that others will be forced to obey the law of nature, a 
                                                                                                             
 177. WOODBRIDGE, supra note 174, at xxi. 
 178. Id. at xxii; see also Lamprecht, supra note 142, at 42 (“Thus the idea of 
man in a state of nature, while not a psychologically adequate analysis of human 
nature (which it was not Hobbes’ purpose to give), is just that analysis of man 
that is most relevant to the political problem with which Hobbes is grappling.”). 
 179. Lamprecht, supra note 142, at 42–43. 
 180. Id. at 43.  
 181. Lamprecht says of Hobbes:  
He did not derive the law of nature from innate imprints, from common 
consent, or from a sort of timeless contemplation of human nature. All 
such methods of deriving it looked to the past, and Hobbes looked to 
the future. He derived the law of nature from human needs, from a 
consideration of the best means of getting from an unsatisfactory 
present to a particular kind of desired future. Hence he showed how to 
give empirical content to a law which until his time had been uselessly 
abstract. 
STERLING P. LAMPRECHT, THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN 
LOCKE 38 (1918) [hereinafter LAMPRECHT ON LOCKE]. 
 182. See supra text accompanying note 59. 
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man is not under obligation to that law himself.183 In the Leviathan 
Hobbes asserts that the  
miserable condition of war . . . is necessarily consequent . . . 
to the natural passions of man, when there is no visible 
power to keep them in awe, and tie them by fear of 
punishment to the performance of their covenants, and [the] 
observation of [the] laws of nature. . . .184 
This statement has two further implications. First, it confirms 
that under Hobbes’s scheme, the state of nature was not a historical 
stage of evolution but simply an analytical tool to describe what 
Hobbes saw as man’s natural tendency to strife and war unless 
checked by a superior authority.185 On this view the Hobbesian 
state-of-nature concept merely serves as a “surrogate” for an 
experiment that is impossible to conduct.186 The concept tries to 
envisage or predict what post-political anarchy would resemble 
without actually dissolving political ties. Second, it demonstrates 
the irrelevancy of the criticism often leveled against Hobbes that it 
is anomalous that the law of nature had no force in the state of 
nature.187 The question of the status or the force of the law of 
nature in the state of nature does not even arise if the state of 
nature is treated as a conceptual tool rather than an evolutionary 
doctrine. In this regard, it is necessary to recall that the law of 
nature is not only elevated to an objective moral standard for all 
civil governments but, under Hobbes’s scheme, it is an eternal law 
binding in foro interno at all times. Indeed, Hobbes elevates the 
law of nature to a “dictate of right reason.” 188  
The law of nature binds in foro externo only when one knows 
that it is safe to assume that every other person will obey it. This 
obedience is guaranteed by civil government.189 Says Hobbes, 
“[t]herefore, notwithstanding the laws of nature (which everyone 
hath then kept, when he has the will to keep them, when he can do 
it safely) if there be no power erected, or not great enough for our 
                                                                                                             
 183. See HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 109 (discussing man’s 
condition in the state of nature). 
 184. Id. 
 185. See supra text accompanying notes 169–173. 
 186. KRAUS, supra note 32, at 192. 
 187. For such a criticism see LAMPRECHT ON LOCKE, supra note 181, at 35.  
 188. See text accompanying supra notes 60–62, and infra notes 254–57; 
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 123, 262; see also WARRENDER, supra 
note 74, at 53–54. 
 189. This is the “contractarian” legitimation of the political sovereign 
through rational choice. See supra text accompanying notes 32–55 (discussing 
legitimation strategies through rational choice theory and game theory). 
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security; every man will, and may lawfully rely on his own 
strength and art, for caution against all other men.”190  
It is thus Hobbes’s “general rule of reason” and “first law of 
nature” “that every man ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has 
hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may 
seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of war.”191 This implies 
that the absence of obligation to obey the law of nature operates 
only where there is no guarantee of reciprocal obedience by one’s 
fellow men.192  
This is far from a categorical denial of the force of the law of 
nature in those aberrations of man when, due to ineffective civil 
organization, he is allowed to slip into his natural tendencies. The 
absence of obligation does not mean that the law of nature has no 
moral value at all in these conditions; indeed, Hobbes says it 
“binds the conscience” in foro interno always.193 “The laws of 
nature oblige in foro interno; that is to say, they bind to a desire 
they should take place . . . ,” says Hobbes.194 It is the conflict 
between this desire on the one hand and the disruptive tendency of 
unregulated behavior on the other that leads man to bring about a 
state of civil government, a state in which the desire is translated 
into and protected by human laws.195 Hobbes says that before the 
state of civil government is achieved, the laws of nature possess 
“qualities that dispose men to peace and obedience. When a 
commonwealth is once settled, then are they actually laws. . . .”196 
This language suggests that under civil government, social 
obligations (the need for which was felt even before the state of 
civil government was brought into being) are given a different 
expression, that this change is only formal not substantive, since 
civil laws express (at least in theory) the substantive content of the 
antecedent natural law obligations.  
The grounding of obligation in civil society is the principle of 
reciprocity.197 Thus, says Hobbes in De Cive: “[f]or one man, 
                                                                                                             
 190. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 109 (emphasis added). 
 191. Id. at 103–04; see supra text accompanying notes 56–62. 
 192. WARRENDER, supra note 74, at 58–59. 
 193. See HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 103. 
 194. Id. 
 195. LAMPRECHT ON LOCKE, supra note 181, at 36. 
 196. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 174; see also WARRENDER, 
supra note 74, at 166 (discussing the relationship between natural and civil law 
in Hobbes’s thought). 
 197. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, 86. The reliance (if not the 
insistence) on reciprocity is but part of the game theoretic calculus that 
reciprocally cooperative behavior in civil society leaves one better off; in other 
words, there is a rational appreciation that the benefits of civil society outweigh 
those without it. See supra text accompanying notes 43–46. 
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according to that natural equality which is among us, permits as 
much to others, as he assumes to himself . . . ,”198 or the corollary: 
quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris.199 In this sense, Hobbes’s 
contention that the law obliges always in foro interno means that 
there is always an obligation to maintain a favorable disposition 
towards obedience of its dictates and towards peace, whereas the 
obligation to act strictly as the law commands is qualified by the 
degree of reciprocal security enjoyed by the agents concerned.200 
If one of the preconditions for law is mutual security through 
reciprocal behavior it follows that there is no reason to conclude 
that legal constraints on behavior are operative only in civil 
society.201 It is true that there are less constraints in the absence of 
civil government than when there is a civil government, but this is 
not because of any a priori assumption as to the non-applicability 
of the law of nature in such a condition; rather, it is because life is 
basically insecure since there is no authority that can guarantee 
reciprocal obedience to laws.202 The need for this greater 
individual freedom in favor of self-defense and self-preservation is 
indisputable under these conditions given Hobbes’s materialistic 
and egoistic psychology of man.  
A corollary to this argument is, of course, that just as it is 
untrue to say that man is free from obligation in the absence of 
civil government, it must be accepted that he may free himself 
from particular obligations—even civil obligations—to avoid 
patent mortal danger—something which always upsets 
expectations of mutual and reciprocal security.203 In the Leviathan, 
                                                                                                             
 198. HOBBES, DE CIVE, supra note 70, at 25.  
 199. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 85. 
 200. See WARRENDER, supra note 74, at 74–75. Indeed, as Warrender points 
out, there may be certain laws of nature that bind in foro interno always, 
regardless of reciprocity, as when, for example, they are “safe” to follow on a 
unilateral basis, or when their observance does not pose personal danger even 
though the overall condition is one of insecurity. 
 201. Id. at 75. 
 202. See id. at 58 (“[I]f any law is to be valid law, or in other words to be law 
and oblige, it must operate in a context in which the validating condition of 
‘sufficient security’ may be said to be fulfilled.”). 
 203. In Hobbes’s own words, 
The end for which one man giveth up, and relinquisheth to another, or 
others, the right of protecting and defending himself by his power, is 
the security which he expecteth thereby, of protection and defense from 
those to whom he doth so relinquish it. And a man may then account 
himself in the estate of security, when he can foresee no violence to be 
done unto him, from which the doer may not be deterred by the power 
of that sovereign, to whom they have every one subjected themselves; 
and without that security there is no reason for a man to deprive himself 
of his own advantages, and make himself a prey to others. . . . How far 
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Hobbes actually uses the word “reciprocal” to describe the nature 
of the civil contract.204 
As for the precise nature of the obligations that bind in foro 
interno, Hobbes asserts that man must “endeavour for peace” and 
maintain a “readiness of mind to observe them whensoever their 
observation shall seem to conduce to the end for which they were 
ordained.”205 The laws of nature require  
[N]o more but the desire and constant intention to 
endeavour and be ready to observe them, unless there be 
cause to the contrary in other men’s refusal to observe them 
towards us. The force therefore of the law of nature, is not 
in foro externo, till there be security for men to obey it; but 
is always in foro interno, wherein the action of obedience 
being unsafe, the will and readiness to perform, is taken for 
the performance.206  
Obligations in foro interno are thus not dependent on the 
principle of reciprocity.207 The individual is always obliged to 
endeavor peace or to be ready for favorable opportunities in which 
he may create peace.208 It is only when he takes specific action that 
the reciprocity of others can be considered by the actor.209 The 
                                                                                                             
 
therefore in the making of a commonwealth, man subjecteth his will to 
the power of others, must appear from the end, namely security. For 
whatsoever is necessary to be by covenant transferred for the attaining 
thereof, so much is transferred, or else every man is in his natural 
liberty to secure himself. 
HOBBES, HUMAN NATURE AND DE CORPORE POLITICO, supra note 95, at 111–12.  
 204. According to Hobbes,  
Whensoever a man transferreth his right, or renounceth it; it is either in 
consideration of some right reciprocally transferred to himself; or for 
some other good he hopeth for thereby. For it is a voluntary act: and of 
the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some good to himself. 
And therefore there be some rights, which no man can be understood 
by any words, or other signs, to have abandoned, or transferred.  
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 86 (emphasis in original). Hobbes then 
asserts: “As first a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them, that assault 
him by force, to take away his life; because he cannot be understood to aim 
thereby at any good to himself.” Id. at 86–87. 
 205. HOBBES, DE CIVE, supra note 70, at 56.  
 206. HOBBES, HUMAN NATURE AND DE CORPORE, supra note 95, at 97.  
 207. See infra notes 224, 226 (containing relevant quotations from DE CIVE  
and LEVIATHAN). 
 208. HOBBES, DE CIVE, supra note 70, at 55. 
 209. Id. at 58. 
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latter phase, i.e. when action is taken, marks the stage of action in 
foro externo.210  
Although man must strive for peace in a society without civil 
government, this does not imply a duty to renounce force in the 
face of impending harm.211 However, man may not act contrary to 
the laws of nature unless he has a good faith belief that action is 
required on grounds of self-preservation: “[I]f any man pretend 
somewhat to tend necessarily to his preservation, which yet he 
himself doth not confidently believe so, he may offend against the 
laws of nature. . . .”212 This shows that not everything one does in a 
society without civil government is justified or excused; it only 
means that a specific act or a series of acts cannot be proscribed 
that could be a bona fide means to self-preservation, while each 
individual continues to be accountable for his acts to his own 
conscience and to God.213  
It should of course be remembered that, in a society without 
civil government, the test for the principle of reciprocal security is 
subjective, since, as noted earlier, the individual is accountable 
only to his own conscience and to God.214 By contrast, the test in 
                                                                                                             
 210. Id.  
 211. WARRENDER, supra note 74, at 56 (explaining that there is no “duty to 
here and now throw away our arms, without suitable guarantees that this will not 
simply leave us as a prey to others”). 
 212. HOBBES, DE CIVE, supra note 70, at 28; see also WARRENDER, supra 
note 74, at 60. 
 213. Further confirmation is given in De Cive for the assertion that man is 
not free from all obligation even in a war-ravaged society without civil 
government: “But there are certain natural laws, whose exercise ceaseth not 
even in the time of war itself; for I cannot understand what drunkenness, or 
cruelty, (that is, revenge which respects not the future good) can advance toward 
peace, or the preservation of any man.” HOBBES, DE CIVE, supra note 70, at 56. 
Thus in cases of drunkenness and “revenge which respects not the future good” 
or, as Hobbes adds elsewhere, revenge “glorying in the hurt of another, tending 
to no end,” HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 100, there is a strong 
presumption against such conduct even in the absence of civil government. See 
WARRENDER, supra note 74, at 61–62. 
 214. See supra text accompanying notes 188–94. The duty to endeavor peace 
in the pre-political condition is almost Kantian in essence. The duty is for its 
own sake; that is, the duty is not discharged when the individual’s conduct is “in 
accordance with law,” when he intended a different or contrary result, or when 
the result was so by chance. If this interpretation is correct, then Hobbes’s 
thought (at least on the concept of duty in the pre-political condition) is more 
deontological than consequentialist. See also Taylor, supra note 80, at 408, 415, 
423 (arguing that the citizen’s duty to obey the law arising from the civil 
“covenant,” and the sovereign’s duty to obey the natural (or moral) law are 
absolute duties, and thus deontological in character). Indeed there is language in 
De Cive supporting Kantian-style absolutism on the question of duty to obey the 
law: “Although a man should order all his actions so much as belongs to 
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civil society has a strong empirical (if not objective) content, 
because in such a society there is a code of positive law, 
prescribing determinate public obligations emanating from a 
determinate human lawmaker and judged by a civil magistrate 
along predetermined lines.215 The nature of obligation of man in 
society (with or without civil government or with an impotent or 
ineffective civil government) may therefore be restated as follows: 
in any given instance of human interaction which takes place on 
the basis of mutual security, the individual is always obliged;216 in 
any other instance he is obliged unless he sincerely believes his 
own personal safety to be in jeopardy at which point he is released 
from the obligation that would otherwise have constrained his 
behavior.217 In the latter kind of case the principle of reciprocal or 
mutual security defines a class of persons rather than historical 
stages of man’s evolution; persons who are not only in an insecure 
position from an objective standpoint but also whose own 
individual subjectivities genuinely lead them to perceive danger in 
particular situations.218  
This once again suggests that it is an oversimplification to 
construe Hobbes’s theory of obligation as meaning that the state of 
nature marks a historical stage in man’s evolution or that while in 
that stage there is/was no force constraining the behavior of man. It 
also reinforces the view that Hobbes’s concept of the state of 
nature was a mere analytical device serving his utilitarian 
consequentialist ends. The same ends are served by rights and 
obligations after the transition to full-fledged civil society is made, 
as the discussion below demonstrates. 
IX. DISTINCTIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF RIGHT AND OBLIGATION IN 
CIVIL SOCIETY 
Hobbes’s conception of civil society suggests that life in civil 
society is more secure and safe,219 that the individual is deemed to 
                                                                                                             
 
external obedience just as the law commands, but not for the law’s sake, but by 
reason of some punishment annexed to it, or out of vain glory; yet he is unjust.” 
Id. at 409 n.1. See also infra note 240 (quoting LEVIATHAN). 
 215. See supra notes 84–85. 
 216. See supra text accompanying notes 188. 
 217. See supra text accompanying notes 189–92. 
 218. Id. 
 219. See HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 112 (describing Leviathan 
as “one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with 
another, have made themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the 
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have given up his right of self-preservation vis-à-vis the 
sovereign,220 that civil law has such an overwhelming effect in all 
aspects of life, that the individual is always obliged, and that there 
is little room for subjective evaluation of the individual’s fears.221 
Thus a code of civil law inspired by natural law, and enforced by 
the courts of a strong monarch whose power is absolute should, 
under Hobbes’s scheme, create reciprocal expectations of universal 
conformity to a given set of behavior patterns.222 Furthermore, the 
scope for breach through subjective evaluation is greatly reduced 
in civil society.223 It would however be incorrect to hold that the 
potential for breach is altogether eliminated.224 More particularly, 
the individual does not completely give up his right to self-defense 
and self-preservation in civil society.225 This becomes apparent if 
the instrumental purpose of civil society is examined: The 
individual contracted to give up his right of self preservation in 
order to enhance his security; therefore, he cannot be presumed to 
have obligated himself to do anything that is contrary to this 
purpose.226 
                                                                                                             
 
strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their peace and 
common defence”). 
 220. See id. (“[A]s if every man should say to every man, I authorize and 
give up my right of governing myself, to this man . . . .”). 
 221. WARRENDER, supra note 74, at 65 (“[I]n a secure ‘situation,’ the agent 
is always obliged to obey the law. . . .”). 
 222. See HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 97 (“The names of just, and 
unjust, when they are attributed to men . . . signify conformity, or inconformity 
of manners, to reason.”).  
 223. See WARRENDER, supra note 74, at 86 (explaining that Hobbes endorsed 
the view that the individual’s subjective interpretation of law only takes 
precedent when there is no sovereign authority). 
 224. HOBBES, DE CIVE, supra note 70, at 39 (“No man is obliged by any 
contracts whatsoever not to resist him who shall offer to kill, wound, or any 
other way hurt his body.”). 
 225. Id.; see also HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 202 (“In the 
making of a commonwealth, every man giveth away the right of defending 
another; but not of defending himself.”). 
 226. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 86–87 (“As first a man cannot 
lay down the right of resisting them, that assault him by force, to take away his 
life; because he cannot be understood to aim thereby, at any good to himself.”), 
202–03 (“[N]o man is supposed bound by covenant, not to resist violence; and 
consequently it cannot be intended, that he gave any right to another to lay 
violent hands upon his person. . . . Also he obligeth himself, to assist him that 
hath the sovereignty, in the punishing of another; but of himself not.”). In De 
Cive, Hobbes reaffirms the existence of as well as the limits to the right of self-
defense in civil society: 
No man is obliged by any contracts whatsoever not to resist him who 
shall offer to kill, wound, or any other way hurt his body. For there is in 
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The fact that the political covenant provides the potential for 
the expansion of the obligations of the citizen only helps to 
underscore the basic purpose of more effectively providing for 
individual security and self-preservation, for it is only under the 
civil system of universally applicable and enforceable law that the 
optimum conditions of security can prevail.227  
The second question that arises in civil society is the scope of 
permissible unilateral breaches based on subjective evaluations. In 
the absence of civil government the individual can refuse to 
perform a covenant entered into with another if the former 
develops a reasonable fear or suspicion of the latter.228 The test is 
(as indicated previously) subjective in that it is for the individual to 
decide whether he is in a position of insecurity.229 By contrast, the 
effect of the political covenant, far from restraining an individual 
to act in self-defense in the face of patent danger, is to restrain him 
from action on suspicion of danger—in other words, the political 
covenant narrows the scope of “just suspicion.”230 The rationale for 
denying the individual the right to repudiate covenants on the basis 
of a suspicion that the other party will not perform his part of the 
covenant is that the power of the sovereign in civil society is such 
that it will eliminate such insecurity due to the sovereign’s ability 
to enforce covenants and thereby guarantee their performance.231 It 
                                                                                                             
 
every man a certain high degree of fear, through which he apprehends 
that evil which is done to him to be the greatest; and therefore by 
natural necessity he shuns it all he can, and it is supposed he can do no 
otherwise. . . . by the contract of not resisting, we are obliged, of two 
evils to make choice of that which seems the greater; for certain death 
is a greater evil than fighting. But of two evils it is impossible not to 
choose the least. 
HOBBES, DE CIVE, supra note 70, at 39–40. The right of self defense is narrowly 
circumscribed in that it is available only in cases of mortal danger. In the same 
passage Hobbes also seems to allow self defense for “wounds, or some other 
bodily hurts” but then seemingly qualifies this by saying that this applies to 
wounds which one is not “stout enough to bear.” Id. 
 227. See HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 112 (noting that civil 
society via the Leviathan provides citizens with security and “peace at home, 
and mutual aid against their enemies abroad”). 
 228. See id. at 89 (“If a covenant be made, wherein neither of the parties 
perform presently, but trust one another; in the condition of mere nature, which 
is a condition of war of every man against every man, upon any reasonable 
suspicion, it is void . . . .”).  
 229. See WARRENDER, supra note 74, at 39. 
 230. See id. at 32–33, 38–45, 114–18. 
 231. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 89–90 (“But in a civil estate, 
where there is a power set up to constrain those who would otherwise violate 
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would appear that if the sovereign were weak or ineffective or for 
any reason unable to guarantee secure conditions of life, the 
individual would, under Hobbes’s scheme, have the right to act 
upon suspicion or in prevention of danger by repudiating his 
obligations under a contract, or by conducting a preventive war.232  
There are three general areas in which the individual in civil 
society may subjectively depart from or breach his covenant:  
(a) where the sovereign has lost effective control and can no 
longer guarantee expectations of reciprocal security;233  
(b) where one party to a covenant reasonably fears that another 
party thererto is about to break the covenant and the 
sovereign will not, for whatever reason, enforce the 
covenant;234  
(c) where any person or authority (including the sovereign) 
does or commands to be done any act that threatens the life 
of a citizen.235 The latter has, in such cases, the right to 
refuse to obey the command and, if necessary, to fight back 
in self-defense, provided that he genuinely fears harm.236  
It can be seen, therefore, that even in civil society the element 
of subjective evaluation of one’s own fears is not completely 
eliminated.  
It must however be remembered, as described above, that 
obligations in conscience (in foro interno) are deemed to be 
binding at all times regardless of the existence or nonexistence of 
civil government and regardless of the principle of reciprocity.237 
Thus the fact that a human legislator has not legislated on a 
particular matter does not mean that individuals may behave as 
                                                                                                             
 
their faith, that fear is no more reasonable; and for that cause, he which by the 
covenant is to perform first, is obliged to do so.”). 
 232. In Warrender’s words,  
But if the citizen should claim exemption from his obligation on the 
ground that he suspects that the sovereign has not the power to enforce 
the agreement and then on the ground that his fellow citizen is not to be 
relied upon, it would appear that Hobbes would have to concede such a 
claim, though he would be entitled to insist that the suspicions or fears 
of the agent must be bona fide if his obligation is to be set aside. 
WARRENDER, supra note 74, at 117–18. This admission is not fatal to Hobbes’s 
thesis, but it does imply that the difference between the State of Nature and civil 
society is not so radical as he sometimes suggests. Id. 
 233. This conclusion is implicit in the passage in Leviathan quoted in supra 
note 231. 
 234. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 89–90.  
 235. Id. at 91–92; supra notes 225–26.  
 236. See supra text accompanying notes 205–06, 211–12. 
 237. See supra text accompanying notes 188, 205–10. 
2012] DECONSTRUCTING HOBBES 859 
 
 
 
they wish.238 Thus obligations in foro interno, not conditioned on 
reciprocity, arise in two fields: The first is during man’s pre-
political natural condition when he is under the sway of the “first 
law of nature,” i.e., when he is subject to the quasi-Kantian duty to 
endeavor peace for the sake of duty itself rather than merely in 
accordance with it. The second field is that which is left 
unregulated by the civil law.239 
The concept of obligation in foro interno thus applies to 
Hobbes’s doctrine as a whole (including his theory of civil 
government) and not just to his concept of the state of nature. If 
obligations in foro interno bind always, then such obligations are 
not discharged by actions which conform to the law where the 
individual did not actually intend to obey it.240 In the latter instance 
the individual continues to be accountable to his own conscience 
and to God, who is the judge of intentions as well as acts.241 This 
applies equally to societies without civil government as well as to 
those under civil government.242 With regard to civil law, specific 
performance in conformity therewith per se satisfies that law 
regardless of the intentions of the actor.243 This is because 
Hobbes’s doctrine requires that the sovereign cannot be given the 
capacity to impose obligations which he cannot enforce.244 Since a 
human judge cannot inquire into the individual conscience he is to 
concern himself only with the external acts of his subjects.245 This 
does not mean that the individual has necessarily discharged all his 
obligations by merely acting in conformity to the civil law. He is to 
be regarded only as having fulfilled his obligations under “civil 
law qua civil law.”246 Intentions continue to be pertinent and for 
this the individual remains accountable to his conscience and to 
God.247  
                                                                                                             
 238. WARRENDER, supra note 74, at 71. 
 239. On the quasi-Kantian duty, see supra text accompanying notes 212–16 
and infra text accompanying notes 254–58. On the “first law of nature,” see 
supra text accompanying notes 58 and 191. 
 240. See HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 103 (“And whatsoever laws 
bind in foro interno, may be broken, not only by a fact contrary to the law, but also 
by a fact according to it, in case a man think it contrary. For though his action in 
this case, be according to the law; yet his purpose was against the law. . . .”); see 
also supra note 214. 
 241. WARRENDER, supra note 74, at 72. 
 242. See id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. See supra text accompanying notes 188–94, 212–13. 
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In this regard, Hobbes’s doctrine has a powerful appeal to the 
modern concept of individual and societal internalization of norms. 
Modern social-anthropologists and psychologists have developed 
the concept of internalization of norms—which in Hobbesian terms 
may be described as the acceptance of norms by the inner 
conscience as inherently just law—as a very effective guarantee 
for a secure and stable legal order.248 
X. NATURAL LAW AND THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF 
SOVEREIGN AND SUBJECT 
The theme of a “higher” eternal law permeates almost all 
aspects of Hobbes’s philosophy. This “natural law” is antecedent 
to civil law and civil society, and is also, according to Hobbes, the 
moral law.249 
One of the premises of this higher law is that every individual 
living in civil society must be deemed to have explicitly or tacitly 
“covenanted” to accept and obey the commands of his ruler or 
sovereign.250 The individual must in fact adopt the commands of 
the sovereign “as if they were his own.”251 The idea of such a 
“covenant” is not however as a priori as it might appear for, as the 
foregoing has demonstrated, civil life is the result of a rational 
calculus and is made up of a web of compensatory and reciprocal 
interactions,252 so that the existence of a constant state of “war of 
every man against every man”253 is of advantage to no one. Thus 
the obligation of the subject not to question his sovereign is an 
expression of collective rationality and is grounded on 
considerations of social necessity.  
It is however also remarkable that Hobbes anticipates Kant by 
asserting the “imperative” character of the moral law, which he 
claims to be the “dictate of right reason.”254 Thus the law of nature 
                                                                                                             
 248. LEOPOLD POSPISIL, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW: A COMPARATIVE THEORY 
271, 344–45 (1974). 
 249. HOBBES, DE CIVE, supra note 70, at 142. 
 250. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 109; see supra text 
accompanying notes 59–62. 
 251. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 107. 
 252. See supra text accompanying notes 32–63, 197–202; see also Taylor, 
supra note 80, at 411. But see WARRENDER, supra note 74, at 74 (criticizing 
Taylor’s overreliance on the notion of reciprocation). 
 253. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 79. 
 254. HOBBES, DE CIVE, supra note 70, at 32; see also Taylor, supra note 80, 
at 409, 411. The parallel with Kant is striking indeed. The latter asserted that the 
transition from the natural to the civil condition was a matter of duty, which 
reason dictated. He viewed the civil condition itself as a “condition of right” 
because there was an objective, eternal, and universally binding principle of 
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is defined as the “dictate of right reason, conversant about those 
things which are either to be done or omitted for the constant 
preservation of life and members, as much as in us lies.”255 
Another definition given by Hobbes is that “A Law of Nature, lex 
naturalis, is a precept, or general rule, found out by reason, by 
which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his 
life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same, and to omit 
that by which he thinketh it may be best preserved,”256 and that it is 
a law “by which men are commanded to endeavour peace.”257  
An essential of natural law is it’s imperative character, thus 
making it possible to derive the following Kantian-style maxim: 
“Even in the ‘state of nature’ the ‘fundamental law’ is not ‘men 
cling to life and are reluctant to leave it’; but ‘I am to do what will, 
so far as I can see, preserve my life, and I am not to do what I 
judge will imperil it.’”258 
The higher or imperative law implies, according to Hobbes, 
that obligation is not created by the sovereign when he enacts laws 
and penalties.259 The moral obligation to obey the natural law is a 
pre-political antecedent to civil society, which explains why 
Hobbes calls this obligation the “first” law of nature.260 Again, the 
antecedent character of natural law underscores the utilitarian 
consequential as well as the reciprocal nature of obligation under 
the moral law. When this law commands a man “to endeavour 
peace” he needs to seek peace only from him who is willing to be 
at peace with him.261 There is therefore no superior common 
protector of peace and a man has to judge for himself whether his 
desire for peace with another is reciprocated by the latter.262 Thus 
                                                                                                             
 
right that was knowable to the human mind. IMMANUEL KANT, Fundamental 
principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, in KANT’S CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL 
REASON AND OTHER WORKS ON THE THEORY OF ETHICS 20 (Thomas Kingsmill 
Abbot trans., 6th ed. 1909). For further discussion, see DORE, supra note 87, at 
415–17 (2007). 
 255. HOBBES, DE CIVE, supra note 70, at 32.  
 256. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 80. 
 257. Id.  
 258. Taylor, supra note 80, at 411. 
 259. Id. 
 260. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 80. See supra text 
accompanying note 58. 
 261. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 80. 
 262. See supra note 226. The following passage from Leviathan is rather 
telling of Hobbes’s consequentialist ethic: 
Whensoever a man transferreth his right, or renounceth it, it is either in 
consideration of some right reciprocally transferred to himself, or for 
some other good he hopeth for thereby. For it is voluntary act: and of 
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the pre-political disposition towards civil society is not (in contrast 
to Kant) an a priori principle but is grounded in experience and 
necessity. 
The imperative and antecedent character of Hobbes’s theory of 
natural law as well as the reciprocal nature of his concept of 
obligation is also borne out by his theory of rights. Rights consist 
of a variety of entitlements, duties and liberties,263which fall into 
two main categories, namely, rights as entitlements and rights as 
liberties.264 Under the first category, rights are duty-imposing 
entitlements.265 A right in this sense refers to the duties others owe 
to the possessor of the right in question.266 It is particularly apt in 
describing the relation between sovereign and subject.267 For 
instance, the sovereign has the right to levy taxes and the subject 
has the duty to pay them.268 However, in a more general sense, the 
scope of the sovereign’s “rights” depends essentially upon the 
duties-formula between subject and sovereign.269 In other words, 
                                                                                                             
 
the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some good to himself. 
And therefore there be some rights which no man can be understood by 
any words, or other signs, to have abandoned or transferred. As first a 
man cannot lay down the right of resisting them that assault him by 
force to take away his life, because he cannot be understood to aim 
thereby at any good to himself. The same may be said of wounds, and 
chains, and imprisonment, both because there is no benefit consequent 
to such patience, as there is to the patience of suffering another to be 
wounded, or imprisoned, as also because a man cannot tell when he 
seeth men proceed against him by violence whether they intend his 
death or not. And lastly the motive and end for which this renouncing 
and transferring of right is introduced is nothing else but the security of 
a man’s person, in his life, and in the means of so preserving life, as not 
to be weary of it. And therefore if a man by words, or other signs, seem 
to despoil himself of the end, for which those signs were intended, he is 
not to be understood as if he meant it, or that it was his will; but that he 
was ignorant of how such words and actions were to be interpreted. 
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 81–82.  
 263. See generally HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, ch. XIV; HOBBES, 
DE CIVE, supra note 70, ch. II. 
 264. WARRENDER, supra note 74, at 18. 
 265. Id. In Warrender’s words:  
Whatever can be said in the rights formula can be said in the (other 
people’s) duties-formula, and therein stated more precisely. . . . Any 
serious examination of this alleged right would have to be a scrutiny of 
the duties-formula that corresponds to it. . . . [S]uch rights are merely 
the shadows cast by duties . . . .  
Id. at 18–19. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
 268. HOBBES, DE CIVE, supra note 70, at 145–46. 
 269. WARRENDER, supra note 74, at 19. 
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the proper question to answer is not whether the sovereign has the 
right to do something, but what duties the subject has vis-à-vis 
those rights. This brings clarity to and avoids certain 
misunderstandings of the nature and scope of the rights of the 
sovereign. It shows that, strictly speaking, the obligation of the 
subject to obey the sovereign is not as absolute and universal as it 
is often made out to be. Thus, for example, the subject is not 
obliged to follow a command that he commit suicide.270 In sum, in 
this first sense, Hobbes used the term “rights” to specify other 
people’s duties in the context of what the latter are obliged to do. 
Hence, this concept of “rights” is nothing more than a jural 
corollary of the Hobbesian concept of obligation. 
The foregoing discussion confirms first the basic utilitarian 
goal of the Hobbesian commonwealth (sovereignty by institution) 
in which sovereign right will generally prevail and in which the 
subject has a general duty to obey the commands of his sovereign, 
the basis for both being the beneficial consequences of establishing 
the commonwealth. Second, in certain rare cases the subject has no 
duty to obey because he does not get “any good to himself” and 
because submission would undermine the very reason for which he 
agreed to submit to the sovereign. This is more clearly brought out 
in Hobbes’s second category of rights as liberties. 
The second sense in which Hobbes uses the concept of “right” 
is that it is something one cannot be obliged to renounce.271 A right 
in this sense is a freedom or exemption from obligation.272 It 
represents the antithesis of duty. Thus a person possesses “true 
liberties” in relation to those things that he cannot be obliged to 
do.273 This also exemplifies Hobbes’s “right to all things” in his 
                                                                                                             
 270. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 82. “No man can be understood 
by any words, or other signs, to have abandoned, or transferred . . . the right of 
resisting them, that . . . take away his life.” Id. (emphasis added to highlight that 
Hobbes clearly had the sovereign in mind since the “transfer” is to the 
sovereign). The transfer to the sovereign of the right of self-preservation was 
effected in order to enhance the subject’s security. Thus, he cannot be presumed 
to have obligated himself to do anything contrary to this purpose. See supra 
notes 226, 262. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Hobbes declares in Leviathan:  
For though they that speak of this subject use to confound jus and lex, 
right and law, yet they ought to be distinguished, because right, 
consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbear; whereas law, determineth, and 
bindeth to one of them: so that law, and right differ as much, as 
obligation, and liberty, which in one and the same matter are 
inconsistent. 
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 80.  
 273. WARRENDER, supra note 74, at 20. 
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state of nature.274 The “right to everything” does not imply that 
men are entitled to everything but that they cannot be obliged to 
renounce anything.275 For example, a right to life or self-
preservation does not signify that the individual is entitled to life, 
in the sense that other men (or the sovereign) have a duty to spare 
him; it signifies instead that the individual cannot be obliged to 
renounce his life and he may resist attempts on his life.276 But if 
fellow citizens have a duty to refrain from killing the individual, 
this duty will derive from the civil law prohibition against murder, 
i.e., obliging people to “endeavour peace” in concrete ways.277 In 
this way civil law strives to harmonize itself with the precepts of 
the antecedent law of nature.  
More importantly however, Hobbes’s utilitarianism is also very 
evident in the realm of what he designates as “true liberties,” or 
rights which the subject cannot be obliged to renounce. The right 
to life and limb (self-preservation) is a well worn example. Yet 
there is a zone of other incommensurable rights which Hobbes 
considers essential to life: 
As it is necessary for all men that seek peace to lay down 
certain rights of nature; that is to say, not to have liberty to 
do all they list, so is it necessary for man’s life, to retain 
some: as right to govern their own bodies; enjoy air, water, 
motion, ways to go from place to place; and all things else, 
without which a man cannot live, or not live well.278 
Were the sovereign to command acts inconsistent with these 
minimal life-sustaining requirements the subject may refuse to 
obey.279 
It has been seen that all consequentialist social theories are 
intentionalist and purposive. Hobbes’s intentionalism has been 
demonstrated above through his numerous references to the “good” 
                                                                                                             
 274. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 80. 
 275. WARRENDER, supra note 74, at 20. 
 276. HOBBES, DE CIVE, supra note 70, at 39–40. 
 277. Id. “[I]n a civil state, where the right of life, and death, and of all 
corporal punishment is with the supreme; that the same right of killing cannot be 
granted to a private person.” HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 70, at 40. 
 278. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 95. This corresponds roughly to 
what H.L.A. Hart calls the “minimum content of natural law,” especially as it 
concerns the human need for “survival” (perseverare in esse suo). H.L.A. HART, 
THE CONCEPT OF LAW 191–98 (2d ed. 1994). 
 279. “[T]hough commanded by the sovereign, [the subject] may 
nevertheless, without injustice refuse to do . . . .” HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra 
note 55, at 133. 
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“reciprocity” “benefit” “consequence,” etc.280 The following 
passage is expressly intentionalist:  
It followeth therefore, that No man is bound by the words 
themselves, either to kill himself, or any other man; and 
consequently, that the obligation a man may sometimes 
have, upon the command of the sovereign, to execute any 
dangerous or dishonourable office, dependeth not on the 
words of our submission, but on the intention; which is to 
be understood by the end thereof. When therefore our 
refusal to obey frustrates the end for which the sovereignty 
was ordained; then there is no liberty to refuse; otherwise 
there is.281 
The qualifier at the end of this passage (“otherwise there is”) is 
an explicit recognition that the subject’s submission to the 
sovereign is conditional upon the “intention” or “the end for which 
sovereignty was ordained.” If the sovereign’s commands contradict 
this intention, the subject may legitimately refuse to obey them. 
Such refusable commands would include not just those which deny 
minimum life-sustaining values but also those which endanger the 
State or the commonwealth itself, for destroying the state would 
clearly contradict the purpose of the covenant. 
Thus “true liberties” and “duty” are inversely related.282 A 
liberty exists where the subject cannot be obliged. On this question 
Hobbes is concerned with the rights of the subject vis-à-vis the 
sovereign rather than the right of the sovereign against his subject. 
The latter has been settled by the covenant in which the subject has 
transferred his right of self-preservation to the sovereign and 
accepted the general duty of non-resistance to his commands. 
The inverse relationship between liberty and duty clarifies the 
former question of the rights of the subject vis-à-vis the sovereign. 
It shows that the individual cannot be obliged to obey commands 
that destroy the purpose of the covenant. In other words, the 
inverse relationship simply makes certain contracts illegal, for 
example, a contract to kill yourself, or a contract not to resist 
someone trying to kill you.283 
Also important to note in the zone of the inverse relationship is 
that the rights of the subject against his sovereign do not impose 
correlative duties on the sovereign; i.e., the subject does not have 
                                                                                                             
 280. See supra notes 204, 226, 262. 
 281. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 134. 
 282. WARRENDER, supra note 74, at 194. 
 283. See supra notes 224–26. 
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entitlements that impose duties upon the sovereign.284 As 
demonstrated above, the inverse relationship only means that the 
subject cannot be made to renounce certain rights and may resist 
commands that tend in this direction. In other words, his general 
duty of non-resistance to the sovereign is held in abeyance in this 
zone of protected liberties.  
The zone of protected liberties marks the outer limits of the 
abeyance of the duty of non-resistance. Beyond it the subject 
resumes his duty of non-resistance to the sovereign. Viewed in this 
manner, the right of the sovereign to govern and mete out 
punishments is not “given” to him by the subject but is derived 
from the natural “right to everything” which is renounced by the 
subject under the covenant (which renunciation gives rise to the 
duty of non-resistance.) As Hobbes observes in Leviathan: 
It is manifest therefore that the right which the 
Commonwealth hath to punish is not grounded on any 
concession, or gift of the subjects. But . . . before the 
institution of Commonwealth, every man had a right to 
everything, and to do whatsoever he thought necessary to 
his own preservation . . . And this is the foundation of that 
right of punishing which is exercised in every 
Commonwealth. For the subjects did not give the sovereign 
that right; but only, in laying down theirs, strengthened him 
to use his own as he should think fit for the preservation of 
them all: so that it was not given, but left to him, and to him 
only; and, except the limits set him by natural law, as entire 
as in the condition of mere nature, and of war of every one 
against his neighbour.285 
In this way Hobbes maintains that the subject gives the sovereign 
no right to punish, but makes his power more effective by 
resigning his own right to resist, except where he is himself put in 
mortal danger, or where the sovereign has lost the power to protect 
his subjects.  
Apart from these limited cases, the subject remains bound by 
all the laws of the sovereign who, in turn, remains the supreme 
commander and law giver who is not accountable to the subject 
and owes no duty to him.286 However unpalatable this omnipotence 
                                                                                                             
 284. See WARRENDER, supra note 74, at 195–96 (“Thus the subject has a 
right to defend his life, but the sovereign has not necessarily a duty to spare it, 
and the sovereign has a duty to observe natural law, but the subject has no right 
to exact that observance.”). 
 285. See HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 190–91; see also 
WARRENDER, supra note 74, at 197. 
 286. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 55, at 110. 
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of the sovereign may seem, under Hobbes’s theory the existence of 
such a power is a condition of sovereignty, while the exercise of 
sovereignty is a condition for the existence of civil society which, 
in turn, is the sine qua non for the maintenance of those peaceful 
and secure conditions of life which assure the best prospect for 
self-preservation and the individual advancement of every 
person.287 The pragmatism inherent in Hobbes’s doctrine suggests 
that not only is civil government an eventual necessity, but without 
a civil sovereign, an even greater and more repressive power may 
emerge: “And whosoever thinking sovereign power too great, will 
seek to make it less, must subject himself, to the power, that can 
limit it; that is to say, to a greater.”288  
The same pragmatism involving a choice between the lesser of 
two evils appears to be reflected in Hobbes’s theory of 
punishment. Commenting on the omnipotent power of the 
sovereign to enforce his law through punishments, Hobbes 
observes:  
It is not enough to obtain this security, that everyone . . . do 
covenant with the rest . . . not to steal, not to kill, and to 
observe the like laws, for the pravity of human disposition 
is manifest to all, and by experience too well known how 
little (removing the punishment) men are kept to their 
duties through conscience of their promises. We must 
therefore provide for our security, not by compacts, but by 
punishments; and there is then sufficient provision made, 
when there are so great punishments appointed for every 
injury, as apparently it prove a greater evil to have done it 
than not to have done it. For all men, by a necessity of 
nature, choose that which to them appears to be the less 
evil.289  
Yet Hobbes is careful to point out that each choice made by 
man is always through a utilitarian calculus. According to Hobbes, 
the voluntary acts of men have as their object some utility, or, at 
least, the avoidance of what is hurtful. It is the nature of man that 
he is compelled to choose that course of action which seems best 
for himself out of the alternatives before him.290 Thus not only are 
voluntary acts (rights) taken with a view to attaining some gain, 
but utility is also the basis of obligation. All obligatory actions 
                                                                                                             
 287. Id. at 137. 
 288. Id. at 157.  
 289. HOBBES, DE CIVE, supra note 70, at 72–73. 
 290. See id. at 24. 
868 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72 
 
 
 
must be at least capable of being regarded by the individual 
concerned as in his best personal interest.  
Viewed in contractarian terms, the political sovereign is 
legitimized as collectively rational because its power of coercion 
guarantees cooperation by everyone. Thus cooperation becomes 
individually rational. It eliminates the uncertainty that might 
otherwise result due to a recalcitrant subject considering himself to 
be better off by not cooperating.291  
CONCLUSION 
Hobbes’s political philosophy is not deontological. He poses 
no founding principles for political society as inherently good; 
indeed he makes no claim that the good is even knowable. Instead 
his philosophy rests on an entirely utilitarian consequentialist 
edifice. His conceptual approaches to the nature of civil society, 
the scope and content of sovereign obligation, the divine covenant, 
the state of nature, and the dictates of right reason which compel 
the move to civil society are instrumentalist in nature, designed to 
ensure “safety and commodious living” for all.  
Hobbes’s theory of political society is based upon a theory of 
duty, and his theory of duty belongs essentially to the natural law 
tradition. Hobbes thus regards the laws of nature as eternal and 
unchangeable and, as the commands of God, they oblige all men 
who reason properly to believe in an omnipotent being under 
whose jurisdiction they must subject themselves in order to pursue 
individual goals under secure conditions. Without such a power, 
Hobbes regards man as having a natural tendency to slip into a 
                                                                                                             
 291. KRAUS, supra note 32, at 63. Kraus states:  
[P]olitical authority is collectively rational because it can transform 
what otherwise would effectively be a single-play prisoner’s dilemma 
into a game in which cooperation is individually rational. By penalizing 
noncooperation (e.g., breach of contract) with coercion, political 
authority can provide even shortsighted individuals with incentives for 
complying in what otherwise would be a standard, single-play 
prisoner’s dilemma in the absence of the state’s sanction for breach. In 
addition, coercion can serve as a deterrent to those whose desire for 
glory disrupts and distorts their reasoning process. Even these 
individuals will no longer mistakenly estimate themselves to be better 
off not cooperating than cooperating. For a state sanction punishing 
noncooperation can dramatically increase the probability and 
magnitude of harm associated with it. Thus, the collective rationality of 
political authority is demonstrated by showing that political authority 
will prevent conflict and enable cooperation among individuals who, 
because of their shortsightedness, necessarily will experience conflict 
and noncooperation in its absence.  
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state of nature, a postulate for which he does not seek historical 
justification but rather for which he cites examples of domestic and 
international anarchy to show that his postulate has validity in 
current circumstances and is also potentially applicable to future 
situations. Thus the state of nature may occur at any point in the 
historical life of a collection of people, i.e., before or after the 
institution of civil government. It is thus not an evolutionary 
doctrine but an analytic device designed to promote security, 
prosperity, equality and liberty. 
The eternal and unchangeable laws of nature do not, however, 
always oblige in the same way and the principles which control the 
manner of their application vary with different circumstances: thus 
one set of principles governs man in society without civil 
government; another set applies to relations between men living in 
political societies; a third set of principles governs the obligations 
of the sovereign, and there is yet a fourth set governing the 
exceptions which suspend the normal duties of the subject to the 
sovereign. Yet in every situation the duties of men in the state of 
nature and the duties of both sovereign and subject in civil society 
are a consequence of a continuous obligation to obey the beneficial 
laws of nature. Therefore even the civil law of the sovereign does 
not create the duties of his subjects, his law merely expresses in a 
different form the antecedent law of nature.  
The duty of the citizen to obey the civil law springs from the 
fact that he has made a valid covenant of obedience and that under 
natural law valid covenants must be honored. At the same time 
however, the scope of the civil law is not unlimited and although 
its authority remains beyond challenge in its own field, there are 
some classes of action, which cannot be regulated by civil law, and 
here the private conscience is the sole guide to action. The civil 
magistrate cannot take cognizance of the intentions of the citizen 
except where they are made manifest by deeds or words. But the 
secret intentions of men are also subject to natural law. Thus in the 
following instances civil law is incapable of replacing the private 
conscience so that action is governed by private interpretation of 
the law of nature: 
(1) where the sovereign has lost effective control (for 
example, due to civil war, foreign invasion etc.) and can 
no longer guarantee conditions of mutual security;  
(2) where a party to a covenant is reasonably feared to be 
about to break the covenant and the sovereign will not, for 
whatever reason, enforce the covenant;  
(3) where any person or authority (including the sovereign) 
does or commands any action that threatens the life of the 
citizen.  
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In any of these instances, however, the sovereign may apply 
sanctions (including death) against the citizen for disobeying him 
because (a) in doing so the sovereign cannot commit any “injury” 
to the subject who has authorized all his actions; and because (b) 
he commits no “iniquity” against natural law provided that in his 
opinion the act is justified. It can be seen therefore that the action 
of both sovereign and subject can be justified in these limited 
circumstances, even though the subject takes a course of action 
which the sovereign punishes. 
Although Hobbes takes as the purpose of the covenant the 
maintenance of political society in which the citizen has no liberty 
to disobey sovereign commands, his theory of self-preservation 
must concede to the individual the right to disobey a command 
which threatens his life. Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty may, in 
view of the foregoing discussion, be summarized in a series of 
propositions:  
(1) The political sovereign is created by covenant which is the 
means whereby men renounce their right to govern 
themselves individually and transfer that right to a single 
person or a body of persons who will guarantee security, 
prosperity, equality and liberty. 
(2) The subjects strengthen the power of the sovereign to the 
extent that they renounce their right of self-preservation. 
(3) The power of the sovereign is strengthened to the extent 
that the subjects give up their right to resist the sovereign. 
(4) There are certain basic life-sustaining values that the 
subjects cannot renounce. 
(5) The civil covenant remains valid on the condition that 
there exist conditions of mutual security subsequent to the 
covenant being entered into.  
(6) Only the unfettered exercise of sovereign power can 
ensure that these conditions prevail with the requisite 
degree of permanency and certainty.  
(7) The free exercise of sovereignty becomes a condition of 
the continuing validity of the political covenant and, 
therefore, of the existence of civil society.  
(8) In view of this, no exercise of sovereignty can be a breach 
of any secular covenant and hence no subject can be 
injured by the sovereign.  
(9) The sovereign is, in any case, not a party to the covenant 
and cannot therefore break it.  
(10) The sovereign is however bound by natural law to a 
system of divine obligations which require of him not 
merely to safeguard the lives of his subjects, but also to 
2012] DECONSTRUCTING HOBBES 871 
 
 
 
provide for them other “contentments of life,” or the 
means to live well.  
(11) Stable civic order is, in the final analysis, ensured by men 
internalizing social norms in foro interno. The power of 
the sovereign to punish must be directed to this end. The 
purpose of punishment must not be revenge but some 
social good, including reformation of the offender so that 
norms are eventually internalized and accepted not out of 
fear of repressive sanctions but out of a belief in their 
inherent utility.  
In this sense, it is clear that Hobbes is a moralist in so far as he, 
far from holding might to be right, believes that might in the 
context of political sovereignty has to be based upon right, “right” 
being understood as consequential utility.  
 
 
